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ABSTRACT 
Patent law defines novelty by the creation of a new embodiment, not an 
idea. For example, the Wright brothers are deemed to have invented the 
airplane because nobody made an airplane before, not because they were 
the first to think of flying. 
Patent law then defines monopoly scope through a theory of disclosure 
of embodiments: despite the airplane being new, the Wright brothers could 
not patent every airplane, ostensibly because they did not teach how to 
make every airplane embodiment (such as a jet fighter). Disclosure theory, 
however, is incoherent. Patent law cannot confine the Wright brothers to 
the embodiment they actually taught—a barely-flying wooden glider—
since doing so would eviscerate incentives. But once we say that patents 
can cover more, disclosure theory provides no limit. If the Wright brothers 
could cover some undisclosed airplanes, why not all undisclosed 
airplanes? 
I argue in this Article for a different theory. In order to be fairly 
credited as the inventor of something, the patentee must be the first to 
articulate the idea of that thing. The Wright brothers could not patent all 
airplanes under this theory, not because they did not disclose how to build 
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every airplane, but because the idea of airplanes was old. By keying 
patent scope to the novelty of the idea rather than the disclosure of 
embodiments, my rule provides a fairer and more accurate measure of the 
patentee’s contribution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The standard theory of patent scope is disclosure. It is axiomatic that 
the invention ―claimed by the patent application must be the same as what 
is disclosed in the specification.‖1 This reflects patent law‘s fundamental 
quid pro quo: the monopoly covers the same invention as what the 
patentee contributes to society through disclosure.
2
 
Disclosure theory, however, is incoherent. For example, it is often said 
that the Wright brothers invented the ―airplane.‖3 But of course the Wright 
brothers did not invent the idea of airplanes. They invented only one 
airplane embodiment: a single barely-flying wooden glider.
4
 A strict 
application of the quid pro quo principle might therefore say that the 
Wright brothers should be confined to replicas of their wooden glider. But 
this would eviscerate patent incentives, because a later pirate would 
change a few nuts and bolts while copying the core aerodynamic 
concepts.
5
 Courts therefore define the invention more abstractly, as an 
―airplane‖ and not a ―wooden glider airplane.‖6 
But once we reject confining patent scope to the precise embodiment 
that has been disclosed, there is no obvious principled limit to this 
abstraction process.
7
 For example, did the Wright brothers invent: 
(1) ―A wooden flying machine with wings and rudders‖? 
(2) ―A flying machine with wings and rudders‖? 
(3) ―A flying machine with wings‖? 
(4) ―A flying machine‖? 
Disclosure theory provides no principle to select among these competing 
levels of abstraction. Clearly some limit is needed, since otherwise the 
Wright brothers would claim all flying machines, including a future anti-
gravity spaceship. As a historical matter, courts limited the Wright 
 
 
 1. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002). 
 2. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) 
(disclosure is the ―quid pro quo of the right to exclude‖). 
 3. See, e.g., WENDIE C. OLD, THE WRIGHT BROTHERS: INVENTORS OF THE AIRPLANE (2000). 
 4. Edwin E. Slosson, How Man Learned to Fly, 14 SCIENCE NEWS-LETTER 349, 351 (1928). 
 5. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 6. The implication, of course, is that the patent covers all airplanes if the invention is defined in 
these terms. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 28 (4th ed. 2007) (describing ―open‖ claims). 
 7. See generally Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1097 (2011). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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brothers to airplanes using wings and rudders, and did not give them all 
flying machines.
8
 But any limit (except to the literal embodiment) is 
arbitrary from the perspective of disclosure theory. After all, the Wrights 
did not teach how to make every airplane using wings and rudders—they 
taught nothing except a single wooden glider. And if they could cover 
some undisclosed flying machines, why not all undisclosed flying 
machines? 
In more practical terms, this incoherence is reflected by the conflict 
between two lines of case law.
9
 One line says that patent scope covers only 
replication of the embodiments disclosed in the specification.
10
 Another 
line says that patentees must not be confined to the embodiments disclosed 
in the specification.
11
 The result of this conflict is ―doctrinal chaos‖ where 
outcomes are impossible to predict.
12
 
Although the problem has been described in previous work by myself 
and others,
13
 no practical solution has emerged. One proposed solution has 
been for courts to calibrate patent scope using economic balancing.
14
 A 
patent covering only a wooden glider would eviscerate incentives, while a 
patent covering all flying machines would create excessive monopoly 
costs, and so a court should choose something in between. The problem 
with this economic balancing approach is that courts lack the capability to 
directly measure such economic variables as social benefits and monopoly 
costs with any degree of precision.
15
 The purpose of this Article is to 
provide a more practical solution. 
The starting point is to note that, conceptually speaking, patent scope is 
directed to an idea.
16
 Although patent claims are often phrased in terms of 
 
 
 8. Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 264 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, 180 F. 
112 (2d Cir. 1910). 
 9. See Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 3, ¶¶ 50–52 (discussing conflicts in doctrine). 
 10. O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119 (1853) (patent covers ―nothing more‖ than 
embodiments disclosed); see also infra text accompanying notes 82–91. 
 11. Dolbar v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 126 U.S. 1, 539 (1888) (―Surely a patent for such a 
discovery is not to be confined to the mere means [the patentee] improvised to prove the reality of his 
conception.‖); see also infra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 12. Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1085 
(2009). 
 13. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 7; Chao, supra note 9; Collins, supra note 12; Jeffrey A. 
Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1141, 1168 (2008). 
 14. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 7, at 1136–39; Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the 
Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 842–44 (1990). 
 15. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 16. See Cont‘l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1908) (patents protect 
the ―principle of the invention‖ (citing 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS § 485 (1890)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/1
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an embodiment—e.g., ―a flying machine‖—the legal effect of the claim is 
to cover the underlying idea. A claim to ―a flying machine‖ is really a 
claim to the idea of artificial flight, since it will cover every flying 
machine. I mean this as a linguistic point about the mechanics of the 
patent document, not about whether such a patent would issue. That is, a 
claim to ―a flying machine‖ might not be granted, but if a patentee submits 
such a claim to the patent office, every patent lawyer would understand the 
claim to cover all flying machines notwithstanding the use of the word 
―a.‖ This a-to-every linguistic trick is basic patent law.17 
Although this linguistic point is simple, once stated explicitly, it 
becomes clear that patent law‘s fundamental quid pro quo is comparing 
apples and oranges. While patent protection is enforced in terms of an idea 
against later accused infringers downstream, the patentee‘s contribution 
over prior inventors is not assessed in those terms. Patent law says that the 
airplane was novel because the Wright brothers were the first to make one 
airplane embodiment.
18
 Patent law does not ask whether the Wright 
brothers invented the idea of airplanes: the idea of airplanes has existed 
since ancient times. 
But in order to be fairly credited as the inventor of the idea and obtain a 
monopoly covering all future implementations of that idea, a patentee 
should be required to be the first to think of the idea in addition to merely 
creating one embodiment of it. My proposal is thus that a patentee should 
obtain a monopoly covering the new and non-obvious idea that he is the 
first to articulate and that is reflected in his embodiment. Importantly, this 
does not mean that the Wright brothers would receive no patent because 
the idea of airplanes had already been articulated.
19
 Rather, the Wrights 
would receive a patent covering the idea at a lower level of abstraction. 
The Wrights did not invent the idea of airplanes, because that idea had 
already been articulated.
20
 But the Wrights did invent the idea of using 
rudders to control flight (or, more technically, linking yaw to roll via a 
 
 
 17. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 28. 
 18. See infra Part I.A.3. As already noted, the Wright brothers‘ patent did not cover every 
airplane. See supra text accompanying note 8. This is not because the airplane was considered non-
novel, but ostensibly because they did not disclose every airplane. The problem is that disclosure 
theory then cannot explain why they were permitted to cover some undisclosed airplanes. 
 19. For the same reasons, it does not mean that the inventor of a hyperdrive would receive no 
patent because of Star Wars. I address this ―science fiction objection‖ in Part IV.A. 
 20. JOHN D. ANDERSON, JR., A HISTORY OF AERODYNAMICS 14–15 (1999). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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rudder).
21
 Not fortuitously, as a matter of historical fact they received 
patent scope closely corresponding to that contribution.
22
 
The beauty of my proposal is that it provides a coherent principle to 
select among levels of abstraction. It is important to note that any new and 
non-obvious
23
 embodiment will always contain a new idea among its 
many levels of abstraction—the new idea is what makes the embodiment 
non-obvious. My claim is simply that this novel insight, rather than the 
embodiment itself, represents the patentee‘s contribution to downstream 
improvers and should define patent scope. A later aluminum airplane 
using rudders for flight control should still infringe the patent, even though 
the Wright brothers could not make aluminum airplanes, because the 
aluminum airplane is still using the Wright brothers‘ idea of rudders for 
flight control. But in order to claim rights to the idea, the patentee must 
really invent the idea as an idea (i.e., be the first to articulate it). 
The argument that patent scope should be defined by the idea that was 
actually invented by the patentee is primarily a moral claim. But it can 
also be cast in economic terms so that it fits comfortably within the 
dominant economics-based paradigm of patent law.
24
 Economically 
speaking, the role of patent protection is to protect against 
misappropriation of information goods that, in the absence of protection, 
would be too easily copied.
25
 Because the misappropriation risk applies to 
the idea and not the embodiment, the patentee‘s insight represents a much 
better way to conceptualize the invention and what patent law should 
protect. But unless the idea was original to the patentee, there is nothing to 
misappropriate. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I provides a brief background 
on novelty doctrine and the claiming of inventions. A key point here is the 
 
 
 21. G.D. Padfield & B. Lawrence, The Birth of Flight Control: An Engineering Analysis of the 
Wright Brothers’ 1902 Glider, 107 AERONAUTICAL J. 697, 698 (2003) (calling the use of a rudder to 
link aircraft yaw and roll ―one of ‗the‘ critical breakthroughs in the history of aviation and aeronautical 
engineering‖). 
 22. See Wright Co. v. Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 264 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, 
180 F. 112 (2d Cir. 1910) (interpreting patent to cover airplanes using a rudder that is linked to aircraft 
roll). In this way, while my theory is primarily normative, it also provides a better explanation than 
disclosure theory for many historical cases. See infra text accompanying notes 206–15. 
 23. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (requiring non-obviousness). 
 24. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 
MINN. L. REV. 697, 697 (2001) (―The foundation for the American patent system is purely 
economic.‖). But see Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 
1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1255, 1257 (2001) (arguing that ―natural-law philosophers shaped 
much of the initial common-law definition of patent rights‖). 
 25. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 294 (2003). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/1
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dichotomy between ideas and embodiments, where the patentee 
contributes a novel embodiment, but claims an idea. Part II then describes 
how this dichotomy between ideas and embodiments renders conventional 
disclosure theory incoherent. Part III describes my proposed alternative, 
where the focus is on the patentee‘s novel insight rather than the 
embodiment being disclosed. Part IV then considers some potential 
objections regarding my proposal, and discusses why these concerns are 
misplaced. A conclusion follows. 
I. THE INVENTION AS IDEA AND EMBODIMENT 
This Part provides some doctrinal background to patents. In particular, 
it is important to note two fundamental features of current patent law. 
First, novelty is assessed on an embodiment-centric basis, in terms of 
asking whether prior inventors had made the invention before. Second, 
patent scope is defined in terms of an idea. These doctrinal features are 
explained in more detail below. 
A. The Embodiment-Centric Assessment of Novelty 
As a matter of first principles, the contribution of an inventor to society 
can be conceptualized in two distinct ways: in economic terms as the 
amount of social welfare benefit that is created by investments in research, 
and in more philosophical terms as the ―invention,‖ i.e., the product of that 
research. Although patent law is fundamentally utilitarian and seeks to 
advance social welfare,
26
 it does not directly measure a patentee‘s 
contribution to society in dollars and utils. Such direct measurement of 
economic contribution is thought to be too difficult.
27
 Instead, patent law 
conceptualizes the inventor‘s contribution as giving society a new 
―invention,‖ and assumes that a monopoly over the invention will confer 
(indirectly and imperfectly) a profit that matches the proper reward.
28
 
Novelty—giving society something it did not have before—is thus 
regarded as the key to a patentable contribution.
29
 
 
 
 26. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (―The economic philosophy behind the clause 
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of 
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare . . . .‖). 
 27. Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 
1844 (1984). 
 28. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 25, at 298–300 (noting the many imperfections of this 
mechanism). 
 29. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 357 (analogizing novelty to the consideration to make a 
contract binding). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This philosophical conception of the invention might be further 
conceptualized in two ways: as a new embodiment or as a new idea. A 
patent might be valuable because it gives society new gadgets 
(embodiment), or new knowledge (idea), or both. The point of the 
remainder of this section is that, when measuring novelty, patent law 
conceptualizes the invention as an embodiment, not as an idea. 
This point can be made intuitively. Why are the Wright brothers 
considered the inventors of the airplane? Surely it is not that they were the 
first to think of the idea of machines that fly—that idea had existed since 
ancient times.
30
 Rather, the Wright brothers are considered the inventors of 
the airplane because they were the first to make a working airplane 
embodiment. 
Patent doctrine formalizes this common intuition. The process of 
determining novelty comprises three steps, which simply reflect the 
intuition we have when we say the Wright brothers invented the airplane. 
The first step is that the patentee must disclose a working embodiment.
31
 
The second step is that the patentee has to identify (or ―claim‖) the feature 
that makes this embodiment new.
32
 The third step is to compare the 
patentee‘s claim against all prior embodiments, to see if the claimed 
feature is in fact new.
33
 The important point, however, is to note that this 
process is embodiment-centric: it focuses on whether prior inventors have 
made an airplane embodiment before. It does not focus on whether the 
idea of airplanes has been previously thought of. 
1. The Patent Specification Describes an Embodiment 
In simplified terms, the specification is the portion of the patent where 
technical knowledge about the invention is provided to the public. It is 
obviously important that the disclosure be detailed and meaningful so that 
the public can gain the full benefit of the invention once the patent 
expires.
34
 Section 112 of the patent statute accordingly mandates that the 
specification ―contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
 
 
 30. See A Brief History of Rockets, NAT‘L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN., http://www.grc.nasa 
.gov/WWW/k-12/TRC/Rockets/history_of_rockets.html (last visited May 26, 2012) (relating the story 
of Archytas‘ mechanical pigeon). 
 31. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 1 (2006). 
 32. 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006). 
 33. Genetics Institute, LLC v. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc., 655 F.3d 1291, 1302 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (―Anticipation and obviousness require the court to compare the properly construed claims 
to the available prior art.‖). 
 34. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974) (citing United States v. 
Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/1
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manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and 
use the same.‖35 
For example, a specification that describes a table invention would 
need to describe what it looks like (is it square or round); what it is made 
of (wood or plastic); how to make it (using nails or screws); and what it is 
used for (dining tables or reading desks). A helpful way to think about the 
specification is that it substitutes for a physical deposit of the invention in 
the patent office. Indeed, where words cannot fully describe the invention, 
a physical deposit may be used instead.
36
 
What this implies is that the ―invention‖ being spoken of by § 112 is a 
concrete and tangible embodiment, not an idea. It would be nonsensical to 
require a description of how to ―make and use‖ an idea, since ideas cannot 
be made. Moreover, the embodiment must be specified down to fairly 
minute detail, since the description must be ―full, clear,‖ and ―exact.‖37 
This means that a very abstract disclosure, such as only saying that ―a 
table is something with a flat surface supported by legs,‖ would be 
inadequate.
38
 In short, when speaking of the invention being disclosed by 
the specification, patent law means a specific embodiment or a set of 
specific embodiments, all of which must be described in detail so that they 
can be made.
39
 
2. Claiming the Inventive Features 
The ―claim‖ in a patent is a one-sentence description of the invention.40 
A patent may (and often does) have multiple claims, since a specification 
 
 
 35. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 36. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 37. 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 38. John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 609, 645 (2009) (―[A]bstraction is the very antithesis of the precision required by the disclosure 
provisions of the Patent Act.‖). 
 39. See Merges & Nelson, supra note 14, at 845 (―Under section 112, the disclosure must be 
sufficient to enable someone skilled in the art to make and use all the embodiments of the invention 
claimed in the patent.‖); see also Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 
1329–30 (2011) (characterizing the present § 112 inquiry as ―whether one could make the 
embodiments claimed‖). 
 40. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006) (requiring claims). Strictly speaking, the claim is part of 
the specification. In conventional parlance, however, the ―specification‖ is used to refer only to the 
disclosure component of a patent, in contradistinction to the claim. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW 
OF PATENTS 40 (2d ed. 2011). I will follow this conventional usage in this Article. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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may contain more than one inventive feature.
41
 But like the specification, 
the claims are supposed to describe the invention,
42
 and this might make 
them seem redundant at first blush. The redundancy is mitigated by the 
fact that the specification and claims serve somewhat different roles.
43
 
While the specification is supposed to provide a very detailed scientific 
and technical disclosure, claims serve the role of identifying the inventive 
feature and thereby demarcating the legal right, i.e., the boundaries of the 
patent.
44
 
The reason that the specification description does not serve the role of 
boundary definition very well is that it tends to ―mix[ ] up the new and 
old.‖45 That is, in order to explain what is so great about the invention, and 
what makes it different from older technology, it is usually necessary to 
describe the older technology itself in the specification, but obviously the 
older technology is not what is being patented. Additionally, the 
specification must often provide various other pieces of extraneous 
background for context. For example, if the invention is a new type of 
LCD monitor, then in order to make the monitor useful one must connect 
it to a computer, and so the specification must describe a computer as 
well—even though the computer is not the core invention that is being 
patented. Thus, although early patent statutes required only a specification 
to describe the invention,
46
 from 1836 onwards the requirement was added 
for a separate claim section in the patent to ―particularly specify and point 
out the part, improvement, or combination, which [the patentee] claims as 
his own invention or discovery.‖47 
What this means in practice is that claims leave out extraneous details 
and focus only on the core inventive features. For example, the inventor of 
a table might make the legs out of oak wood, and the specification would 
describe the detailed properties of oak wood and why oak is good for 
 
 
 41. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of 
Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2121 (2000) (average patent has approximately fifteen 
claims). 
 42. Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (―The claims are 
directed to the invention that is described in the specification . . . .‖). 
 43. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―[T]he two standards, 
while complementary, approach a similar problem from different directions.‖ (quoting Rengo Co. v. 
Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
 44. S3 Inc. v. NVIDIA Corp., 259 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (―The purpose of claims is 
not to explain the technology or how it works, but to state the legal boundaries of the patent grant.‖). 
 45. Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356, 434 (1822). See id. at 433–35. 
 46. Patent Act of 1790, § 2, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109; Patent Act of 1793, § 3, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. 
 47. Patent Act of 1836, § 6, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117; see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006) 
(requiring ―one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter 
which the applicant regards as his invention‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/1
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furniture. But obviously it is not particularly important that the legs of a 
table be made from oak, or even any type of wood at all. Rather, the key 
features of a table are that it has a flat surface and is supported by legs.
48
 
Thus, a typical claim to a table could read:  
I claim that my invention is an apparatus comprising  
a flat surface that is adjoined to  
one or more legs. 
The point of the claim is to identify the inventive features in a table—
having a flat surface connected to legs—and exclude the irrelevant 
features, such as that the patentee‘s particular table is made of oak wood. 
It is worth noting here that the claim must, at least stylistically, be 
directed to a physical thing. A patentee cannot say, ―I claim to have 
invented the engineering principle that flat surfaces supported by legs will 
not fall over.‖ Such a claim would be considered invalid because it does 
not claim an invention as defined by the statute,
49
 i.e., a process, machine, 
manufactured article, or composition of matter.
50
 As will be seen in 
Section B, this stylistic requirement is devoid of substance. But it is worth 
noting because it reflects the embodiment-centric conception of the 
invention as a physical thing. 
3. Comparing the Claimed Features to Prior Embodiments 
The third step in determining novelty and contribution is to compare 
the claimed inventive feature with the prior art—to check if what is 
claimed to be new really is so.
51
 The ―prior art‖ is thus patent law‘s 
version of the public domain. 
What is important to understand is that the prior art is a set of 
preexisting embodiments, not a set of preexisting ideas. Under what is 
 
 
 48. WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2324 
(1986) (defining table as ―a piece of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on legs‖). 
 49. In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (claim phrased as directed to a ―signal‖ 
is non-statutory and invalid); Efthimios Parasidis, A Uniform Framework for Patent Eligibility, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 323, 364 (2010). 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 51. The recently enacted Leahy-Smith America Invents Act makes this comparison explicit by 
amending the patent statute to require a comparison between the ―claimed invention‖ and the prior art. 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, § 3, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 285–93 (2011). This 
amendment is purely stylistic, as the practice of comparing claims against the prior art had been firmly 
established even before this. Key Pharm. v. Hercon Labs. Corp., 161 F.3d 709, 714 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
The duality of the ―claimed invention‖—which can either mean an embodiment or an idea—also 
remains unchanged from the statute. 
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known as the ―enablement requirement for prior art,‖52 a prior reference 
such as a book or article must teach how to make an embodiment, or it is 
not prior art.
53
 In many ways, this requirement is similar to the requirement 
of § 112 that the specification teach how to make and use the invention. 
The two are mirror opposites in their effect: § 112 invalidates a patent 
where it fails to teach an embodiment;
54
 whereas the enablement 
requirement for prior art ―invalidates‖ a prior reference.55 What both imply 
is that, conceptually speaking, the invention being disclosed (either in the 
prior reference or in the specification) must be an embodiment that can be 
made. 
The fact that the prior art is, conceptually speaking, only a set of 
preexisting embodiments may be somewhat counter-intuitive to those 
familiar with patent practice. In real life the most frequently encountered 
types of prior art are printed publications like books and articles,
56
 not 
physical models and prototypes. But these are still disclosing 
embodiments, in the same way that patent specifications under § 112 
disclose embodiments. A printed publication is only relevant if, and to the 
extent that, it teaches how to make an embodiment.
57
 By themselves, the 
ideas disclosed by articles and books are considered worthless to patent 
law.
58
 In other words, patent law frequently encounters embodiments that 
are only constructively reduced to practice. But a constructively made 
embodiment is still ―made‖ nonetheless.59  
The ostensible policy reason underlying the enablement requirement 
for prior art is that mere ideas are not socially valuable.
60
 The belief is that 
unless the prior art is limited to working embodiments, then patent law 
would end up rewarding science fiction writers with over-active 
 
 
 52. Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis Pharm. Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 53. Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 555 (1870) (―[T]he knowledge supposed to be derived 
from the publication must be sufficient to enable those skilled in the art or science to understand the 
nature and operation of the invention, and to carry it into practical use.‖). 
 54. CFMT, Inc. v. Yieldup Int‘l Corp., 349 F.3d 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003). It should be noted 
that this application of § 112 does not entail a levels of abstraction problem. If the patent teaches no 
embodiment at all and is entirely invalid, there is nothing to abstract out from. The patentee simply 
receives no monopoly. 
 55. Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (if a prior 
reference is not enabled, court must exclude the reference from consideration). 
 56. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for 
Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 331. 
 57. Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1355 (non-enabled reference is excluded from evidence). 
 58. Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942) (Hand, J.) (―If 
the earlier disclosure . . . does not inform the art without more how to practice the new invention, it 
has not correspondingly enriched the store of common knowledge . . . .‖ (emphasis added)). 
 59. See Collins, supra note 12, at 1095–96. 
 60. Dewey, 124 F.2d at 989. 
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imaginations speculating about future inventions.
61
 A science fiction writer 
who imagines a hyperdrive would preempt a hard-working inventor who 
actually creates such a device. 
What occurs in the novelty comparison, therefore, is to compare the 
patentee‘s specification embodiment (constructively made) against the 
prior art embodiments (also usually constructively made). The comparison 
is not only for novelty but also for non-obviousness.
62
 Non-obviousness is 
simply an extension of novelty, in that the invention must not only be new, 
but it must be so substantially new that it is worth giving a monopoly 
over.
63
 The claim identifies this new and non-obvious part or feature, and 
it then defines the boundary of the patent right.
64
 This entire process 
operates on an implicit conceptualization of the invention as an 
embodiment, and views a patentable contribution as giving society new 
embodiments that had not been made before. 
B. Claims and Downstream Coverage of Ideas 
Although every patent claim is phrased as if it were describing the 
specification embodiment and the assessment of novelty is a comparison 
of embodiments, it is at the same time important to understand that a 
patent‘s downstream coverage (against people subsequent to the patentee) 
is much broader. The claim to a table having a flat surface connected to 
legs does not cover just one table; it covers every table. This a-to-every 
transition is basic patent law.
65
 Yet it creates something of a paradox.
66
 
 
 
 61. See Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 DUKE L.J. 919, 952 (2011) 
(arguing that ―mere recitation‖ of an invention ―constitute[s] nothing more than speculation about [its] 
potential or theoretical existence‖ (quoting In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538, 543 (C.C.P.A. 1973))). 
 62. Some people might object that obviousness is different from novelty because ―a non-enabling 
reference may qualify as prior art for the purpose of determining obviousness.‖ Symbol Techs., Inc. v. 
Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991). But later cases clarify that ―[a]lthough published 
subject matter is ‗prior art‘ for all that it discloses, in order to render an invention unpatentable for 
obviousness, the prior art must enable a person of ordinary skill to make and use the invention.‖ In re 
Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). What this means is that an individual prior reference 
need not teach a working embodiment, but the prior art as a whole (which is the aggregation of all 
prior references) must. Thus, the prior art as a whole still exists only as a set of embodiments for 
obviousness purposes. 
 63. P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 APLA Q.J. 87, 97 n.5 (1977) (―[N]ot everything 
which is new is capable of being patented. The newness, that is the difference over what was 
previously known, must be sufficient in character, or in quantity, or in quality, in order that the new 
thing may be patented.‖); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). 
 64. Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 384 F.3d 1333, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (―It is axiomatic 
that the claims mark the outer boundaries of the patent right to exclude.‖). 
 65. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 28. 
 66. Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 6 (2009). 
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The paradox is that the practical coverage of a claim encompasses far 
more than the embodiment that is disclosed in the specification.
67
 The 
patent on a table will cover not only the patentee‘s specific table made 
using oak wood, but also tables made of any other material. Notably, this 
includes later-developed materials such as plastic or steel, and even more 
futuristic materials that have not even been invented today. In other words, 
the patent with this claim becomes a monopoly that covers the very idea of 
a table—something with a flat surface and legs. Although ideas are 
supposed to be unpatentable,
68
 at the same time every patent in practical 
terms covers an idea of some sort. This paradox has long been 
recognized,
69
 but it has never been resolved. 
Of course, not every kind of idea is subject to patent coverage. 
Philosophical concepts and mental thoughts in the head are more difficult 
to claim, simply because a claim must still be phrased as if directed to an 
embodiment.
70
 The point is not that every idea can be patented, but that 
every patent covers an idea. 
Allowing patent coverage to exceed the precise limits of the 
specification embodiment makes good policy sense. Were it otherwise, 
pirates would circumvent the patent too easily. Even the most stupid pirate 
could take the patentee‘s oak table and make a cedar table.71 Thus, from an 
economic perspective, patents must allow some degree of abstraction, to 
say that, for example, the precise type of wood does not matter. But once 
we allow abstraction, then the claim will cover an idea of sorts. An 
abstraction is an idea.
72
 The idea might be comparatively narrow (e.g. 
wooden tables, made of any type of wood) or comparatively broad (e.g. 
tables, made of any material); but they are all still ideas. 
 
 
 67. Id.; see also Robin C. Feldman, The Inventor’s Contribution, 2005 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 6, 
¶ 60 (2005) (―A patent holder need only identify a single use and a single embodiment for the product 
to receive rights to a wide range of embodiments and all uses.‖). 
 68. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (―[O]ne may not patent an idea.‖). 
 69. 1 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS 190–91 (1890) (―No proposition has been 
more frequently or positively stated by the courts than that a principle is not a patentable invention, 
and yet with almost equal positiveness and frequency they have declared that the subject-matter 
covered by a patent is the principle of the invention.‖). 
 70. See In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding that a pure mental process 
is not patentable). 
 71. See Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., 168 F.2d 691, 693 (2d Cir. 1948) (Hand, 
J.) (―[I]t is always, or almost always, possible to change the form . . . and yet cull the full advantage of 
the discovery.‖). See id. at 693–94. 
 72. See EMERSON STRINGHAM, DOUBLE PATENTING 209 (1933) (―In patent law there is no 
possibility of clear thinking until it is understood that an ‗invention‘ as protected . . . is an abstraction, 
an idea of means.‖). 
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This creates a real tension in patent law‘s fundamental quid pro quo, 
which is the basis of disclosure theory.
73
 If the invention for upstream 
novelty purposes is an embodiment, while the invention that defines 
downstream coverage is an idea, then the quid pro quo equation breaks 
down. The next Part discusses this problem in detail. 
II. THE INCOHERENCE OF DISCLOSURE THEORY 
Suppose tomorrow a scientist discovers that a certain type of 
radiation—call it X radiation—cures AIDS when administered at a certain 
dosage—say 10 rads—and builds a radiation machine to implement this 
cure. The scientist then files a patent, wherein he discloses this cure in 
detail, including the 10 rad dosage and the details of the radiation 
machine. This is surely a new, useful, and non-obvious invention worthy 
of a patent. But what is the ―invention‖ that has been ―disclosed‖? 
From a certain point of view, we might argue that the patent discloses 
only a single radiation machine for curing AIDS at a dosage of 10 rads of 
X radiation.
74
 The implication of this characterization of the invention is 
that a later pirate who uses 11 rads, or builds a slightly different machine, 
would not infringe the patent. This outcome would eviscerate patent 
incentives. 
But as with the example of the airplane in the Introduction, once we 
reject confining patent scope to the precise embodiment that has been 
disclosed, there is no obvious principled limit on permissible abstraction. 
The patentee may try to claim all cures for AIDS, including a future pill 
that bears no resemblance to radiation, or perhaps even claim that the 
invention is ―a cure for a previously incurable disease.‖ In practical terms, 
the invention might be claimed in the following ways: 
(1) A cure for AIDS 
(2) A cure for AIDS using radiation 
(3) A cure for AIDS using X radiation 
(4) A cure for AIDS using 10 rads of X radiation 
 
 
 73. See J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l., Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) 
(disclosure is the ―quid pro quo of the right to exclude‖). 
 74. See, e.g., O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119 (1853) (―The specification of this 
patentee describes his invention or discovery, and the manner and process of constructing and using it; 
and his patent . . . covers nothing more.‖). 
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Each level of abstraction seems equally accurate in describing the 
invention.
75
 But translated into patent scope they have very different 
practical effects. A later-developed pill infringes the first claim but not the 
others. A court adjudicating infringement thus must choose—it cannot 
avoid the question. And this dilemma is not limited to courts: any 
decision-maker who has to decide patent scope, such as the patent office, 
must select the level of abstraction at which a patentee will be permitted to 
claim.
76
 The question is the legal principle by which this choice is made. 
One way to narrow down the range of choices would be to rely on the 
well-established doctrines of novelty and non-obviousness.
77
 These 
doctrines do provide some limit on permissible scope, if the claim reaches 
already-existing things. An even-more-abstract claim to ―a cure for 
disease‖ would be invalid, because it would cover existing cures for other 
diseases. But the novelty standard, confined as it is to preexisting 
embodiments, is obviously inadequate for patent law‘s needs. The scientist 
can argue that ―a cure for AIDS‖ is new, because nobody has made a cure 
before. Similarly, the Wright brothers could have argued that a claim to all 
airplanes is new, because nobody had made an airplane before. But 
granting a patent covering a later pill cure having nothing to do with 
radiation, or covering a future antigravity airplane, seems obviously 
excessive. Some other limit is needed. Because novelty is a very lax limit 
in its embodiment-centric incarnation, patent law relies on disclosure 
doctrine to provide this additional limit.
78
 
 
 
 75. Cf. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
29, 31–40 (2005) (arguing that claim language has a similar levels of abstraction problem). It is worth 
noting that I disagree with the Burk and Lemley argument. Burk and Lemley argue that because a 
court might construe the term ―a screw‖ to cover only wooden screws, or any screw, or any fastening 
device in general, there is no objectively right answer as to what ―screw‖ means. But the fact that 
courts can twist language to reach any result does not prove that the word ―screw‖ has no objective 
meaning to ordinary readers. It simply proves that courts have lots of power. In contrast, the levels of 
abstraction problem with the invention is not just that courts disagree, but that there is no objectively 
right answer more generally. Conflict in judicial outcomes here reflects the underlying issue. Ordinary 
people do not think the word ―screw‖ means all fastening devices. They do sometimes think that the 
Wright brothers invented all airplanes. 
 76. I focus on courts because they have the final say. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141, 282 (2006) 
(providing for direct and collateral review of patent office decisions). 
 77. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2006). 
 78. See Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (patentee 
―is entitled to claims as broad as the prior art and his disclosure will allow‖ (quoting In re Rasmussen, 
650 F.2d 1212, 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981))). 
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A. Disclosure Theory in Doctrine 
The two primary doctrines that limit permissible abstraction are the 
disclosure doctrine of § 112, and the abstract idea doctrine.
79
 Both 
ultimately reflect the disclosure theory. As this section will demonstrate, 
both are incoherent. 
1. Section 112 
The disclosure theory is most clearly reflected in § 112 of the patent 
statute, which states that the specification must ―contain a written 
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and 
using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art . . . to make and use‖ the invention.80 The corollary 
of the requirement that the specification describe how to make and use the 
invention is that, should the specification fail to do so, the patent would be 
invalid.
81
 
As a textual matter, the most plausible reading of § 112 is that it 
defines the invention as an embodiment (or set of embodiments) that can 
be ―made.‖ What follows is that the most conceptually coherent and 
textually faithful way to implement § 112 is to define claim scope in the 
same terms. In short, patent scope must be limited to the embodiments 
whose manufacture and use are taught by the specification. Covering 
untaught embodiments would be forbidden under this logic. 
More or less, this is the dominant understanding of § 112.
82
 I say ―more 
or less‖ because this line of case law permits one minor fudge at the edges, 
which is that an infringing embodiment may be implicitly taught by the 
specification, by combining the specification disclosure with the 
background knowledge of people in the relevant scientific field (or, in 
patent parlance, the ―skill of the art‖).83  But an implicitly taught 
 
 
 79. Another doctrine which performs this function is the reverse doctrine of equivalents, which 
again is tied to disclosure in limiting patentees to their specification embodiment. See In re Hogan, 559 
F.2d 595, 607 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (reverse doctrine of equivalents requires ―interpretation of claims in 
light of the specification‖). I do not discuss this doctrine because it is dead. See Roche Palo Alto LLC 
v. Apotex, Inc., 531 F.3d 1372, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent 
Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 145 (2006). 
 80. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 81. 35 U.S.C. § 282(3) (2006). 
 82. Lemley et al., supra note 39, at 1329–30 (characterizing the § 112 inquiry as ―whether one 
could make the embodiments claimed‖); Merges & Nelson, supra note 14, at 845 (―Under section 112, 
the disclosure must be sufficient to enable someone skilled in the art to make and use all the 
embodiments of the invention claimed in the patent.‖). 
 83. Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (―[A] 
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embodiment is still taught, so the amount of stretching is minor.
84
 Thus, in 
Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW, Inc.,
85
 the Federal 
Circuit held that a patentee who invented a mechanical crash sensor (to 
deploy air bags when a crash occurs) could not cover a later-developed 
electronic sensor using the basic same design, because the patent 
specification did not adequately teach how to make electronic sensors.
86
 
The rule limiting patent claims to the embodiments taught by the 
specification, however, would eviscerate patent incentives. Confining the 
patentee to the specific embodiments in the specification would mean that 
a pirate could change a few nuts and bolts and thereby avoid 
infringement.
87
 The fudge that specification teaching can be supplemented 
by background knowledge helps to mitigate, but does not solve, this 
problem. While background knowledge may allow making very minor 
changes like paint color, it cannot even bridge the small gap between a 
mechanical sensor and an electronic sensor of the same design.
88
 
Moreover, the relevant time for ascertaining what the specification teaches 
is when the patent is filed,
89
 and supplemental background knowledge is 
thus likewise frozen at this time.
90
 But technology often evolves very 
quickly, so the frozen background knowledge becomes outdated in short 
order.
91
 
Thus, a contrary line of cases holds that patentees may claim 
undisclosed future improvements.
92
 This line of cases criticizes the 
economic effect of limiting patentees to the specification embodiments: 
 
 
patent need not teach, and preferably omits, what is well known in the art‖). 
 84. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (cautioning that 
the Hybritech rule is ―merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling 
disclosure‖). 
 85. 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 86. Id. at 1284. 
 87. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950). 
 88. Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1284. 
 89. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 90. Id. (―[A] patentee preferably omits from the disclosure any routine technology that is well 
known at the time of application.‖ (emphasis added)). 
 91. For example, within the term of the Wright brothers‘ patent, aviation evolved from their 
barely-working glider to World War I fighter planes that were much better. See Padfield & Lawrence, 
supra note 21, at 717 (―[A]fter 1908 the rate of progress in aviation was quite startling; progress 
which, in many ways, would leave the Wright brothers behind . . . .‖). 
 92. See, e.g., SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(―The law ‗does not require that an applicant describe in his specification every conceivable and 
possible future embodiment of his invention.‘‖ (quoting SRI Int‘l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp., 775 F.2d 
1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc))); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533 
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (―[A] broad claim . . . is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on 
another embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed.‖ (internal citation omitted)). 
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[Section 112] does not require the inventor to foresee every means 
of implementing an invention at pains of losing his patent franchise. 
Were it otherwise, claimed inventions would not include improved 
modes of practicing those inventions. Such narrow patent rights 
would rapidly become worthless as new modes of practicing the 
invention developed, and the inventor would lose the benefit of the 
patent bargain.
93
 
The two lines of cases under § 112 directly contradict each other. One line 
forbids claiming beyond the specification embodiments and forbids 
claiming later-developed technology; the other allows both. A citation to 
one line or the other can justify any outcome. As Judge Rader of the 
Federal Circuit summarized when discussing two cases from opposing 
camps: ―In LizardTech, this court says that a claim scope in excess of the 
specification‘s embodiments invalidates the claim. In JVW, this court says 
that a claim scope in excess of the specification‘s embodiments grants a 
broader range of infringement. The facts are very similar, the results are 
not.‖94 But although the problem is familiar, no solution has appeared. 
2. The Abstract Idea Doctrine 
At first blush, it might seem strange for me to include the abstract idea 
doctrine in a section about disclosure theory. On its face, the abstract idea 
doctrine simply holds that an ―idea‖ cannot be patented,95 and says nothing 
about disclosure.
 
But as shall be seen, the abstract idea doctrine in fact 
shares the same themes, concerns, and problems as the § 112 cases.
96
 
This can most easily be seen by comparing and contrasting two famous 
Supreme Court cases that are classified under the abstract idea doctrine:
97
 
Samuel Morse‘s invention of the telegraph and Alexander Graham Bell‘s 
invention of the telephone.
98
 On their face, these inventions seem closely 
analogous: each was a long-sought and revolutionary telecommunications 
 
 
 93. Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 94. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 95. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874). 
 96. Indeed, the conflict can be seen throughout the history of patent law, under different doctrinal 
names. See Karl B. Lutz, Evolution of the Claims of U.S. Patents, 20 J. PAT. OFF. SOC‘Y 134, 383–84 
(1938) (discussing the conflict between ―strict‖ and ―liberal‖ approaches in the Supreme Court‘s 1853 
Term). 
 97. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of ―An Unpatentable Abstract Idea‖, 
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37, 50 (2011) (classifying Morse as an abstract idea case). 
 98. O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853); Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 
(1888). 
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device. What is not at all alike is how they were treated by the Supreme 
Court, a dissimilarity that has puzzled generations of patent lawyers.
99
 
In the first case, when Morse came before the Court, he expressly 
attempted to claim a very high level of abstraction: 
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of 
machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the 
essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the 
electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism, 
however developed for marking or printing intelligible characters, 
signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that 
power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.
100
 
As the Court interpreted this claim, it covered every mode of ―writing or 
printing at a distance by means of the electric or galvanic current.‖101 
Thus, under this interpretation, the claim would cover modern fax 
machines and email.
102
 
The Supreme Court held that the claim was ―too broad‖ and thus 
invalid.
103
 The Court‘s reasoning in support of this holding is somewhat 
murky,
104
 but it expressed two basic concerns. First, as a legal matter, the 
Court cited the then-recent case of Le Roy v. Tatham,
105
 which had stated 
in dicta that ―a principle is not patentable.‖106 The Court then held that the 
use of electromagnetic force to transmit characters was an unpatentable 
principle.
107
 Neither Le Roy nor Morse, however, explained in more detail 
what the legal test for an unpatentable principle or idea would be. 
In addition to the conclusory and uninformative reasoning that the 
claim was directed to an unpatentable abstract idea, the Court gave a much 
more practical reason. It reasoned that the claim would cover many future 
variations and improvements of the telegraph, and would thereby impede 
 
 
 99. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1768 (2009); Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in the 
Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 793 
& n.111 (2008). 
 100. Morse, 56 U.S. at 112. 
 101. Id. at 113. 
 102. Richard H. Stern, Scope-of-Protection Problems with Patents and Copyrights on Methods of 
Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 105, 117 n.43 (1999). 
 103. Morse, 56 U.S. at 113. 
 104. See A. Samuel Oddi, Regeneration in American Patent Law: Statutory Subject Matter, 46 
IDEA 491, 512 (2006) (describing the Court‘s reasoning as ―somewhat mystifying‖). 
 105. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156 (1852). 
 106. Id. at 175. 
 107. Morse, 56 U.S. at 117. 
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progress.
108
 To prevent this, the Court held, patentees should be rigorously 
limited to the embodiments described in their specification: 
The specification of this patentee describes his invention or 
discovery, and the manner and process of constructing and using it; 
and his patent . . . covers nothing more.
109
 
From this reasoning, one might interpret the abstract idea doctrine to state 
a legal rule that patentees are strictly limited to the specific embodiment 
taught by the specification. Covering anything more would render the 
claim an impermissible abstraction. This has obvious similarity to the first 
line of cases under § 112.
110
 
But this rule is directly contradicted by the Court‘s subsequent decision 
in Dolbear v. American Bell Telephone Co.
111
 In Bell, an analogous 
inventor of an analogous device filed a very similar-looking claim to 
Morse. Bell‘s claim read: ―The method of, and apparatus for, transmitting 
vocal or other sounds telegraphically, as herein described, by causing 
electrical undulations, similar in form to the vibrations of the air 
accompanying the said vocal or other sounds, substantially as set forth.‖112 
What this means in English (or, more relevantly, as the Court interpreted 
it) is that it claims using continuous electric current that mimics sound 
waves to transmit voice across distances.
113
 Obviously, transmitting voice 
using electricity in a telephone is rather analogous to transmitting text 
using electricity in a telegraph. Despite these similarities, the Court upheld 
Bell‘s claim.114  The Court‘s formal distinction was that Bell‘s claim 
identified continuous electric current in a closed circuit, while Morse‘s 
claim was to any type of electric current.
115
 This formal distinction, of 
course, is rather implausible, since nobody really thinks that Morse was 
claiming the use of electricity outside of a closed circuit (i.e., using 
lightning). 
 
 
 108. See id. at 113. 
 109. Id. at 119 (emphasis added). 
 110. See Duffy, supra note 38, at 645 (―[A]bstraction is the very antithesis of the precision 
required by the disclosure provisions of the Patent Act.‖). 
 111. 126 U.S. 1 (1888). 
 112. Id. at 13–14. 
 113. See id. at 537 (―The method, ‗as herein described,‘ is to cause gradual changes in the 
intensity of the electric current used as the medium of transmission, which shall be exactly analogous 
to the changes in the density of the air, occasioned by the peculiarities in the shapes of the undulations 
produced in speech . . . .‖). 
 114. Id. at 535. 
 115. Id. at 534–35. 
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But the more fundamental problem is that the cases state directly 
contradictory legal rules for whether a patentee can claim more than the 
specification embodiment. In Bell, the Court rhetorically states, ―Surely a 
patent for such a discovery [as the telephone] is not to be confined to the 
mere means [Bell] improvised to prove the reality of his conception.‖116 
Logically, this states a rule: patentees can cover more than the 
embodiment (or ―means‖) disclosed in the specification. But in Morse, the 
Court states flatly that a patent covers ―nothing more‖ than ―the means 
[the patentee] specifies.‖117 Even taking the factual distinction concerning 
closed circuits at face value, the legal rules being stated still directly 
contradict each other. 
What this means is that ―no one can figure out what constitutes abstract 
ideas.‖118 Commentators have long suspected that outcomes in this area 
are being determined by extra-legal considerations rather than meaningful 
legal doctrine.
119
 This, too, is a lot like § 112.
120
 
B. The Economic Balancing Alternative and Its Problems 
An interesting contrast to the approach of patent law to scope is the 
approach of copyright. Copyright law has essentially the same levels of 
abstraction problem as patent law: limiting copyright scope to verbatim 
reproduction of the literal text would mean that ―a plagiarist would escape 
by immaterial variations,‖121 but once the law allows more, there is no 
principled limit on how much abstraction should be allowed.
122
 If changing 
a few words is still plagiarism, then why not lines, pages, or chapters? 
Although the problem is rather similar, copyright courts differ from 
their patent counterparts in addressing the problem more transparently. 
Copyright courts acknowledge that the levels of abstraction problem exists 
and that doctrine cannot resolve it,
123
 and some courts go so far as to 
acknowledge that decisions about copyright scope in fact depend on extra-
 
 
 116. Id. at 539. 
 117. O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 119 (1853). 
 118. Michael Risch, Forward to the Past, 2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 333, 336. 
 119. See, e.g., 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2][c] (2011) (―The holding in 
the Telephone Case was undoubtedly influenced by the desire to secure recognition and reward for 
Alexander Graham Bell.‖). 
 120. See Chiang, supra note 7, at 1136–37 (arguing that the incoherence of § 112 doctrine means 
that courts resort to economic considerations). 
 121. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
 122. Id. (―Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary . . . .‖). 
 123. Id. 
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legal economic balancing.
124
 Patent courts acknowledge none of these 
things.
125
 However, as described above, patent doctrine equally fails, and 
the decisions are thus necessarily being driven by extra-legal 
considerations. 
If legal rules will not work and the analysis is being driven by extra-
legal considerations, perhaps one answer is that patent law should simply 
follow the copyright example. That is, instead of trying to make the 
abstract idea doctrine or § 112 more coherent and meaningful, perhaps 
they should be deemed empty labels. The real decision about appropriate 
patent scope would be determined by an economic balance between 
maximizing the incentive benefits of greater patent scope against 
minimizing the monopoly costs.
126
 Judges would thus first attempt to 
calculate the optimal patent scope, and then manipulate doctrine to reach 
these predetermined results, and as in copyright law they would be more 
honest about what they were doing. 
Transparency and candid acceptance of doctrinal failure can be 
considered a virtue in itself.
127
 But an approach that relies on courts 
directly measuring and balancing economic costs and benefits has the 
problem that courts are institutionally ill-equipped to collect the kind of 
economic information needed to make accurate assessments.
128
 This is an 
acknowledged problem in copyright law.
129
 Patent courts are unlikely to 
do any better.
130
 
In theory, one advantage of openly acknowledging the role of 
economic balancing in scope decisions is that it allows litigants to supply 
courts with the missing information about the relevant economic 
variables.
131
 But even with such help, collecting complete and accurate 
economic information is still a frightfully expensive exercise.  
 
 
 124. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971) (―The 
guiding consideration in drawing the line is the preservation of the balance between competition and 
protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.‖). 
 125. Auto. Techs. Int‘l, Inc. v. BMW, Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 126. Chiang, supra note 7, at 1136–37; Merges & Nelson, supra note 14, at 868–71. 
 127. See Mathilde Cohen, Sincerity and Reason-Giving: When May Legal Decision Makers Lie?, 
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1091, 1091 (2010). 
 128. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 1844 (―A central reason for reliance on a patent system is that it is 
thought to be too difficult to determine the appropriate level of reward fairly and accurately on a case-
by-case basis.‖). 
 129. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 130. See Keith E. Maskus, Lessons from Studying the International Economics of Intellectual 
Property Rights, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2219, 2221 (2000) (noting the ―complex calculation among the 
interests of innovators, consumers, and second comers‖ and that comparing real life with the 
theoretical ideal is ―fraught with conceptual and practical difficulties‖). 
 131. Chiang, supra note 7, at 1139. 
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An example of a legal regime where litigants do provide courts with 
the relevant economic information is antitrust law. Modern antitrust law 
generally relies on the ―rule of reason,‖ where ―the factfinder weighs all of 
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice 
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.‖132  The result is that antitrust cases depend on enormous 
amounts of economic data collection and battles of experts.
133
 While most 
commentators applaud the modern economics-focused approach of 
antitrust law over the prior approach of relying primarily on legalistic per 
se rules,
134
 there is little doubt that the modern approach results in very 
costly litigation.
135
 The accuracy benefits are also limited given that judges 
are ill-equipped to comprehend the complex economic data when the 
experts are in sharp conflict (as they always are).
136
 
Such a costly information-gathering process cannot be justified for the 
overwhelming majority of patents or copyrights, because the 
overwhelming majority of patented inventions and copyrighted works 
eventually prove to be worthless in the market—they are books that 
nobody wants to read and gadgets (or, more accurately, ideas about 
gadgets) that nobody wants to use.
137
 In those cases, the relevant 
intellectual property provides neither benefit to its owner nor monopoly 
cost to the public, and it is not administratively efficient to engage in a 
massive economic data collection effort to determine whether the right 
 
 
 132. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977). 
 133. Andrew I. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly Fine Line Between the 
Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 663, 663 
(1997). 
 134. See, e.g., Arndt Christiansen & Wolfgang Kerber, Competition Policy with Optimally 
Differentiated Rules Instead of ―Per Se Rules vs Rule of Reason‖, 2 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 215 
(2006) (arguing for ―differentiated rules‖ rather than either a per se rule or a rule of reason approach); 
Frank H. Easterbrook, On Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972, 980 
(1986) (―What we need is a set of intelligent presumptions, not a stab at the ultimate question of 
efficiency.‖); Thomas A. Lambert, Dr. Miles is Dead. Now What?: Structuring a Rule of Reason for 
Evaluating Minimum Resale Price Maintenance, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1937 (2009) (arguing for a 
―structured‖ rule of reason). 
 135. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citing William H. Wagener, 
Note, Modeling the Effect of One-Way Fee Shifting on Discovery Abuse in Private Antitrust Litigation, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1887, 1898–99 (2003)) (discussing the ―unusually high cost of discovery in 
antitrust cases‖); see also, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
(noting that it took a seventy-six-day trial to collect relevant facts). 
 136. Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust, 6 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 153, 195–96 (2010); see also Easterbrook, supra note 134, at 780 (arguing 
that judges are making stabs in the dark). 
 137. Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the Common 
Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141, 150 (2008). 
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should be issued in the first place.
138
 Unlike antitrust trials that occur only 
rarely, the patent office processes over 500,000 patent applications every 
year.
139
 Conducting a detailed economic study on every patent application 
is neither feasible nor administratively worthwhile. 
Thus, it seems that economic data will not be available in the vast 
majority of cases. Practically speaking, an economic balancing approach 
must instead rely on a judge‘s rough guesses about the relevant economic 
variables.
140
 While candidly using rough economic guesses to reach 
outcomes is better than outwardly pretending to use legal rules while still 
relying on the same rough economic guesses sub rosa, neither regime can 
be considered very satisfactory. 
C. The Costs of Incoherence 
Uncertainty about patent scope is almost self-evidently bad. The usual 
framing of the problem is economic: uncertainty increases litigation cost 
and business risk.
141
 Because patentees and their competitors are all risk-
averse, an increase in the uncertainty of the patent system harms 
everyone.
142
 As James Bessen and Michael Meurer have shown, in many 
areas the cost of patent litigation is exceeding the research and 
development investments that the patent system is supposed to be 
incentivizing in the first place.
143
 
These economic costs are real, but they are not the only costs. A more 
subtle cost of doctrinal incoherence is that the resulting judicial discretion 
and use of extra-legal considerations undermines the legitimacy of the 
patent system and of the judiciary more generally.
144
 This is the case 
 
 
 138. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 
(2001). 
 139. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FISCAL 
YEAR 2010 125 (2010) (showing 553,549 applications processed). 
 140. Nash v. CBS, Inc., 899 F.2d 1537, 1541 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that courts ―muddle 
through‖). 
 141. See, e.g., Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1308 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(―Patent litigation is too complex and the results too uncertain for parties to accurately forecast . . . .‖). 
 142. See Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)certainty, Legal Process, and Patent Law, 43 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1109, 1140 (2010) (arguing that uncertainty harms competitors); John W. Schlicher, 
Patent Licensing, What to do After Medimmune v. Genentech, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 
364, 380 (2007) (arguing that increasing risk harms risk-averse patent owners). 
 143. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 153 (2008). 
 144. See Or Bassok, The Sociological-Legitimacy Difficulty, 26 J.L. & POL. 239, 264–65 (2011) 
(arguing that courts perceive a need to rely on formal discretion-constraining rules to maintain their 
legitimacy); Paul J. Mishkin, Foreword: The High Court, the Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time 
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regardless of whether judges achieve good economic results through such 
extra-legal use of discretion.
145
 The promise of the patent system is an 
automatic monopoly covering the same invention as the patentee 
contributes,
146
 not a monopoly that judges in their wisdom determine is 
sensible, using unknown and unobservable methods. The very fact that 
courts rhetorically emphasize the idea of an automatic quid pro quo 
defining monopoly scope suggests that the idea is important to public 
confidence in the patent system.
147
 The failure of reality to match the 
rhetoric is itself a harm.
148
 This legitimacy cost is difficult to measure,
149
 
but it surely exists. 
The legitimacy cost problem answers one common response to my 
proposal, which is that the current system is not broken and does not need 
fixing, because judges ultimately intuit the importance of the patentee‘s 
intellectual contribution and thus manipulate doctrine to produce the same 
outcomes as would occur under my rule.
150
 While it is true that my 
proposal produces many of the same bottom-line outcomes as current 
cases,
151
 suggesting that judges are in fact using many of the same 
intuitions when exercising their discretion, there is a significant difference 
between surreptitiously using extra-legal intuitions to reach good results 
and transparently incorporating those same intuitions into formal doctrine. 
 
 
and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 62 (1965) (arguing that ―much of courts‘ prestige and power‖ depends 
on ―the strongly held and deeply felt belief that judges . . . exercise no individual choice‖). 
 145. See John W. Salmond, Introduction, in SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY 
VARIOUS AUTHORS lxxv, lxxxi (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B. Register trans., 1917) (―In the 
application and enforcement of a fixed and predetermined rule . . . , a man will willingly acquiesce. 
But to the ‗ipse dixit‘ of a court, however just or impartial, men are not so constituted as to afford the 
same ready obedience and respect.‖); see also Luke K. Cooperrider, The Rule of Law and the Judicial 
Process, 59 MICH. L. REV. 501, 504–05 (1961). 
 146. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 402 (1960) 
(―[O]ne of the beauties of the patent system [is that t]he reward is measured automatically by the 
popularity of the contribution.‖). 
 147. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974). 
 148. See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda 
v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 55–56 (2010) (arguing against ―stealth overruling‖ for transparency 
reasons). But see Michael L. Wells, ―Sociological Legitimacy‖ in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1011, 1014 (2007) (arguing that ―the Court's opinions may serve worthy goals and earn 
our respect even if other reasons account for outcomes‖). 
 149. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
1787, 1828–29 (2005) (―Recent studies by social scientists have advanced understanding of judicial 
legitimacy in numerous ways. Nevertheless, many of the most important questions remain 
unanswered.‖); id. at 1832–33. 
 150. Cf. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 95–96 (noting that the nexus between Bell‘s claim 
and his intellectual contribution is an important practical consideration in explaining the outcome, but 
not attempting to incorporate this into doctrine). 
 151. See infra Part III.C.2 (detailing how my proposal would explain the historical case outcomes 
in Morse and Bell). 
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My proposal does the latter, and in this way it enhances the legitimacy of 
the patent system. 
D. The Proposals in Existing Literature 
Proposals in academic literature have largely tracked the same 
deficiencies and difficulties that courts have faced. The literature can be 
broadly divided between what I will call the ―doctrinal‖ approach and the 
―economic‖ approach. The doctrinal approach attempts to create legalistic 
solutions to the problem, usually by polishing and reforming the disclosure 
doctrine of § 112.
152
 The deficiency of the legalistic approach is that it 
usually ends up at one or the other extreme, just like the case law. For 
example, Oskar Liivak argues that patent scope should be defined as the 
―set of embodiments conceived and disclosed by the inventor in enough 
detail that they can be reduced to practice,‖153 which seems to mimic the 
rule reflected by such cases as Morse and Automotive Technologies 
exactly. But Liivak does not explain how his rule would avoid the pitfall 
of this approach, which is that later improvements cannot be taught at the 
time of the patentee‘s initial conception, but at least some such later 
improvements (e.g., substituting plastic for wood) should be covered.
154
 
Other doctrinal proposals go to the opposite extreme. Timothy 
Holbrook, for example, argues that patent scope should cover everything 
that the patent specification would teach a person of ordinary skill in the 
field to make and use at the time of infringement (as opposed to current 
law where disclosure is judged at filing).
155
 While this might seem like a 
sensible compromise at first blush, since this would allow us to substitute 
new materials like plastic as they arise, in reality the proposal is basically 
identical to the unlimited-scope line of cases. The reason is that by the 
time of infringement, by definition at least one person of skill in the 
field—the infringer—knows how to make and use the accused device, no 
 
 
 152. See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 66, at 40 (purporting to solve the ―possession paradox‖—
another way of stating the levels of abstraction problem—by tying patent scope to disclosure). 
 153. Oskar Liivak, Rescuing the Invention from the Cult of the Claim, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 
5 (2012). 
 154. Liivak later argues that one can avoid this problem by characterizing the invention abstractly. 
Id. at 49–50. But this contradicts his original test in a way that perfectly reflects the current doctrinal 
contradiction. An invention is either an abstraction, or it is a concrete set of specifically disclosed 
embodiments. It cannot be both at the same time. Moreover, to the extent that the invention is an 
abstraction, the permissible level of abstraction must then be delineated, and Liivak never explains 
how high he would allow abstraction to go. 
 155. Holbrook, supra note 66, at 40–44. Holbrook places this standard under the doctrine of 
equivalents. But since infringement can be found either through the claim or by the doctrine of 
equivalents, the result is ultimately that the more generous standard governs patent scope. 
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matter what the accused device is. Thus, this proposal for patent scope 
makes infringement a virtual tautology. The only way to escape 
infringement would be to argue that the infringing device somehow 
reflects ―extraordinary skill‖ so that it does not count, a standard that 
seems clearly too generous to patentees.
156
 And if courts start watering 
down and manipulating this extraordinary skill standard, then the rule 
would lose its meaning and we end up back at square one where judges 
have plenary discretion. 
Other scholars have more complicated proposals that are less 
predictably extreme, but still view the problem through the lens of 
specification disclosure and still sink under the weight of the levels of 
abstraction quagmire. For example, Jeffrey Lefstin argues that claims can 
only cover the same genus as what the specification ―defines‖ as the 
invention.
157
 A specification would define a genus, in turn, by 
distinguishing a particular genus from higher and lower levels of 
abstraction.
158
 Apparently what this means is if the patentee says in the 
specification that his invention is the genus of every cure for AIDS, and 
distinguishes this from a more narrow patent covering only radiation 
machines for curing AIDS, then he would be able claim every cure for 
AIDS because he has distinguished the genus. But this rule is without 
substance. Claims are already required to define a genus by distinguishing 
it from all others.
159
 All Lefstin‘s rule seems to require is that the same 
definition be repeated in the specification. Allowing patentees to cover 
high levels of abstraction because they know how to cut and paste is not a 
useful legal standard.
160
 
Criticism can similarly be levied at Dan Burk and Mark Lemley‘s 
proposal to change patent law to a central claiming system.
161
 A central 
 
 
 156. Another reason it becomes a virtual tautology is that the person of skill in the art, under 
standard doctrine, is imputed with perfect knowledge of the entire public domain at the relevant time 
point. In re Winslow, 365 F.2d 1017, 1020 (C.C.P.A. 1966). So unless the accused infringing product 
was non-public, it would be automatically included. 
 157. Lefstin, supra note 13, at 1211. 
 158. Id. 
 159. A point that, ironically, nobody has made better than Lefstin himself. Id. at 1168–69 
(observing that ―essentially all patent claims . . . are genus claims‖). See also 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 
(2006) (requiring claims to ―particularly point[ ] out and distinctly claim[ ]‖ the subject matter being 
patented (emphasis added)). 
 160. There is one potential difference. Claims can be amended after filing, while specifications 
cannot, and Lefstin‘s proposal thus protects against opportunistic claim amendment that retroactively 
broadens scope. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 543–49 
(2010) (discussing the ex post claiming problem). But Lefstin is not attempting to address this timing 
problem, and his proposal is not limited to cases where patentees amend their claims. 
 161. Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, at 1783–84. 
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claiming system is more accurately called a ―no claiming‖ system: the 
patentee need not have any claims at all, and courts would simply grant 
scope covering all future embodiments that are substantially similar to the 
specification embodiment.
162
 It can immediately be seen that everything 
depends on what courts will regard as ―substantially similar,‖ a standard 
that is obviously very open-ended.
163
 A central claiming system is thus 
equivalent to plenary judicial discretion. It is, to be sure, more transparent 
about this than the current regime, but central claiming ultimately still 
shares all the problems of a regime that relies on judicial discretion to 
reach good results. Judges (or juries) would still have to rely on extra-legal 
intuitions like economic balancing to determine what counts as 
―substantially similar,‖ and having patent scope depend on the discretion 
of judges (or juries) would still contradict the basic promise of the patent 
system to inventors.
164
 
In contrast to the doctrinal literature, which mirrors the levels of 
abstraction problem that already plagues the doctrine, a more general 
literature examines the patent scope problem through an economic lens,
165
 
with the ultimate goal being to grant the optimal amount of patent scope 
that balances incentive benefits against monopoly costs. Economists have 
constructed elaborate models for calculating this optimal balance.
166
 The 
difficulty with this approach is, of course, that courts lack the institutional 
capability and information to determine the optimal scope of each patent 
on a case-by-case basis.
167
 
III. UPSTREAM CAPTURE: A DIFFERENT VIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
In this Part, I want to offer a somewhat different perspective on the 
patent scope problem than the approaches of the prior literature. The 
approach can still be considered doctrinal rather than economic, but it 
differs from the existing doctrinal literature that generally focuses on 
disclosure, in the sense of the number and types of embodiments taught by 
 
 
 162. Id. at 1784–85. 
 163. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the Bar of 
Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 309–10 (noting that the uncertainty created by this standard was why 
we abandoned central claiming in the first place). 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 144–49. 
 165. See, e.g., Chiang, supra note 7; Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in 
Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989 (1997); Merges & Nelson, supra note 14. 
 166. See, e.g., Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J. 
ECON. 106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND 
J. ECON. 113 (1990). 
 167. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 1844; see also supra Part II.B. 
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the specification—an approach that leads right back to the levels of 
abstraction quagmire of existing case law. Once I lay out the approach, I 
will also explain why my proposed solution produces good economic 
outcomes, though my starting point is not an economic analysis. 
A. Upstream Capture Versus Downstream Capture 
My approach in this Article differs from the existing literature in that 
my focus is not on the specification disclosure. Of course, the patentee 
must still file a specification, and the specification must still disclose at 
least one working embodiment to receive a patent; but the amount of 
disclosure (in the sense of the range and number of embodiments, in 
contradistinction to the novelty of the insight that lies underneath) would 
have very little to do with the scope of the patent under my approach. 
What I argue is that patent scope should focus on the novelty of the 
patentee‘s intellectual contribution. A more detailed explanation follows. 
A starting point is to note, as in Part I, that patent law uses the concept 
of ―invention‖—which is synonymous with the patentee‘s contribution—
in two contexts, which I shall call the ―upstream‖ context and the 
―downstream‖ context. In the upstream context, the law compares the 
patentee‘s contribution against prior inventors, or in other words assesses 
novelty. In the downstream context, the law compares the patentee‘s 
contribution against later improvers, which is the patent scope problem 
and which, in current law, is framed as an issue of disclosure under § 112. 
And as has already been noted, patent law‘s definition of the invention 
differs across these two contexts. In the upstream context, patent law 
defines the invention as an embodiment or set of embodiments.
168
 In the 
downstream context, patent law defines the invention as an idea.
169
 
This inconsistency can be explored more deeply. The intuitive—not 
strictly economic—justification for allowing patentees to cover later 
improvements is that we assume that a later improver copies ideas from 
the patentee,
170
 and that these copied ideas have value.
171
 For example, 
 
 
 168. See supra Part I.A. 
 169. See supra Part I.B. 
 170. See Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law's Presumption of Validity, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007) (arguing that, under ―normal circumstances,‖ patent protection means that 
the patent ―protects the inventor from having his idea stolen‖). Chris Cotropia and Mark Lemley argue 
that copying by infringers is actually very rare. Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying 
in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1457 (2009). But they agree with me that the rhetorical and 
philosophical justification for patent protection is based on copying by infringers. Id. at 1431–36. The 
disconnect between theory and practice, in this view, simply means that patent rights are too strong. Id. 
at 1458–59. 
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when the Wright brothers create the first airplane and a later improver 
creates a slightly improved airplane, we assume that the later improver 
nonetheless copied some principles of aerodynamics that the Wrights first 
discovered. In the downstream context, patent law recognizes that an 
earlier inventor contributing ideas to a later improver is a contribution of 
value, and thus requires the later improver to pay for this value.
172
 
Not so in the upstream context. As already described, in the upstream 
context patent law defines the invention as an embodiment, not an idea.
173
 
But the inconsistency goes deeper. Patent law defines the invention as an 
embodiment because, in the upstream context, it deems ideas to have no 
value. This sentiment is deeply entrenched in patent law, and was most 
clearly expressed by Learned Hand as the reason for the enablement 
requirement for prior art: 
No doctrine of the patent law is better established than that . . . . [i]f 
the earlier disclosure . . . does not inform the art without more how 
to practice the new invention, it has not correspondingly enriched 
the store of common knowledge, and it is not an anticipation.
174
 
Thus, when the Wright brothers assert their patent against later airplanes, 
patent law assumes the later improver used ideas from the Wright 
brothers, and that using ideas amounts to a misappropriation of value. But 
it never asks whether the Wright brothers themselves used preexisting 
ideas from even earlier inventors. It never asks the question because 
upstream ideas are deemed to have no value, absent embodiments. 
The gap that emerges is that the idea that the patentee asserts against 
later improvers—the value the later improver is alleged to have 
misappropriated—may not in fact originate with the patentee, but rather 
 
 
 171. By ―value‖ here I am using the term in a philosophical, not strictly economic, sense (I will 
come back to the economic analysis later). To an economist, whether something has value depends on 
whether someone is willing to pay for it. Here, I am saying that the law philosophically recognizes that 
the idea has value and therefore someone should be made to pay for it. See Adam Mossoff, Saving 
Locke from Marx: The Labor Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 
& POL‘Y 283, 285 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1983614 (distinguishing between the 
―natural law‖ and ―economic‖ concepts of value). 
 172. An excellent example of this intuition is seen in In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970), 
where the court stated: ―[A]n inventor should be allowed to dominate the future patentable inventions 
of others where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings. Such improvements, while 
unobvious from his teachings, are still within his contribution, since the improvement was made 
possible by his work.‖ Id. at 839. 
 173. See supra Part I.A. 
 174. Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942) (emphasis 
added). 
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with an even earlier inventor. Giving the patentee too much credit 
upstream then leads to giving the patentee too much credit downstream. 
What the enablement requirement for prior art fundamentally misses is 
thus the reality that prior ideas do have value to the patentee (just as they 
do to an even later infringer) because invention is a continuous process of 
ever-more-specific ideas. The patentee‘s working embodiment is the 
culmination of this chain of ideas. To take the example of the cure for 
AIDS again, in order to create a working cure for AIDS using X radiation, 
the following ideas must be developed: 
(1) Someone must diagnose AIDS as a distinct disease that requires 
a separate cure.
175
 
(2) Once AIDS is identified as a distinct disease, someone must 
suggest radiation therapy (as opposed to pills or other methods) as 
an avenue to pursue.
176
 
(3) Once radiation therapy has been identified as a possible avenue, 
someone must suggest X radiation in particular as a possible cure. 
(4) Once X radiation has been identified as a potential cure, 
someone must find the right dosage and calibrate a radiation 
machine to make X radiation work. 
Once we understand that invention is a cumulative process, what emerges 
is that patent law places far too much emphasis on, and gives far too much 
credit to, the eventual creator of a working embodiment. Each of these 
ideas is necessary to the eventual creation of the working embodiment, 
and are thus contributions of value. But the early inventors will receive no 
credit from the patent system because they fail to create embodiments: the 
first person to think of curing AIDS is unlikely to find a cure, and the first 
person to think of using radiation is unlikely to find the right type of 
radiation. The patentee who eventually creates the working embodiment 
 
 
 175. In reality, this occurred in the early 1980s when researchers realized some people suffering 
ordinary symptoms like pneumonia were in fact suffering a distinct condition of weakened immune 
systems. Michael S. Gottlieb et al., Pneumocystis carinii Pneumonia and Mucosal Candidiasis in 
Previously Healthy Homosexual Men: Evidence of a New Acquired Cellular Immunodeficiency, 305 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 1425 (1981) (noting AIDS as a new type of disease). 
 176. In reality, this has already happened. See Ekaterina Dadachova et al., Targeted Killing of 
Virally Infected Cells by Radiolabeled Antibodies to Viral Proteins, 3 PLOS MED. 2094 (2006), 
available at http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pmed.0030427. 
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should not be able to claim sole credit for all of the prior ideas.
177
 In other 
words, in order to be fairly credited as the inventor of the cure for AIDS, a 
person should be the first to have the idea as well as to create the working 
embodiment. To do otherwise would be stealing credit from upstream 
inventors. 
This upstream-focused view is different from the standard disclosure 
paradigm that dominates today‘s patent law, where the patent scope 
problem is viewed through the lens of whether the patentee has taught 
every cure for AIDS, or every radiation cure for AIDS, or every dosage 
and machine variant of radiation X for curing AIDS. The standard 
disclosure-focused and embodiment-centric view asks an impossible and 
thus useless question. My standard, by contrast, asks a question that 
matches much of the moral intuition of patent law: was the inventor the 
first to contribute the idea to the public? 
From this new perspective, current patent law essentially creates the 
levels of abstraction problem for itself. What the enablement requirement 
for prior art does is artificially deem every patentee (who by definition 
creates the first working embodiment) to be a sui generis pioneer. Because 
all prior ideas by other inventors are excluded from evidence, the first 
person to create one cure for AIDS is artificially made to seem as if he 
invented all the ideas within that embodiment, from curing AIDS in the 
abstract down to discovering the specific dosage of X radiation. The levels 
of abstraction problem thus arises: the law must choose one idea among all 
of these options. Abolishing the enablement requirement for prior art then 
solves the levels of abstraction problem. The next section describes this in 
more detail. 
B. A Proposed Solution: The Patentee’s Insight 
Once we adopt the perspective that patent law should be logically 
consistent across the upstream and downstream contexts, a solution to the 
patent scope problem emerges. What I propose is that a patentee should 
receive the level of abstraction where he is both the first to create a 
working embodiment and also the first to articulate the idea. 
It is important to understand that ―articulation‖ is not just a slightly-
weakened version of enablement or a disclosure test by another name. 
Conventional thinking equates disclosure with the teaching of how to 
 
 
 177. See Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 709 (2012) 
(arguing that innovation is cumulative and ―the canonical story of the lone genius inventor is largely a 
myth‖). 
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make an embodiment: to enable the cure for AIDS means teaching how to 
make that cure. My articulation standard literally requires no more than a 
sentence that suggests the possibility, with no details on how to achieve it, 
such as: ―It would be a good idea to have a cure for AIDS.‖ 178  The 
difference between articulation and the conventional understanding of 
disclosure are thus sufficiently distinct to rise to the level of a difference in 
kind, not merely of degree. 
How my proposal operates can be made clearer by reference to the 
AIDS example. In order to obtain any patent at all, the patentee must first 
create a working embodiment of a cure for AIDS. Even then, the patentee 
would not be allowed to claim the highest level of abstraction of all cures 
for AIDS, because the idea of curing AIDS has already been articulated. 
But if he was the first person to think of using radiation to cure AIDS 
(where everyone else, for example, had only thought of using pills), then 
the proper level of abstraction is the cure of AIDS using radiation, which 
would encompass every type of radiation. Conversely, if the idea of using 
radiation had already been articulated by others, but no particular type of 
radiation had been identified, and the patentee is the first to suggest X 
radiation, then X radiation would be the proper level of abstraction (and 
would cover every dosage and every machine using X radiation). In short, 
the patentee who creates the first working embodiment would be entitled 
to his insight: the highest level of abstraction reflected in his embodiment 
that has not previously been articulated by others. 
Three points are worth noting about this proposal. The first is that 
under this rule, the problem of allowing patents of clearly excessive scope 
(such as all cures for AIDS) largely disappears. In order to obtain a patent, 
an inventor must still create a working embodiment. But the first person to 
articulate AIDS as a distinct disease that requires curing is unlikely to also 
be the first person to create a working cure.
179
 And the later person who 
eventually creates the working cure would now be barred from claiming 
the super-high level of abstraction of the cure for AIDS, because that high-
level idea has already been articulated. 
The second point is that there always is some conceptual breakthrough, 
and so a patentee who creates a new working embodiment will always 
 
 
 178. The immediate objection that often arises—that someone merely suggesting a possibility of a 
cure should get no patent—is addressed in Part IV.A infra. The short version is that I would allow 
mere articulation to act as prior art, but to obtain a patent would still require one (but only one) 
working embodiment. 
 179. For why it is sensible to still deny patents to the prior inventors who thought of high-level 
ideas like curing AIDS without creating embodiments, even without an enablement requirement for 
prior art, see infra Part IV.A.2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/1
  
 
 
 
 
2012] DEFINING PATENT SCOPE 1245 
 
 
 
 
receive a patent. This point is important to emphasize because the 
immediate criticism of my proposal would be that the inventor of a cure 
for AIDS would receive no patent because people have been looking for a 
cure and thus have articulated the idea, or that the inventor of a hyperdrive 
would receive no patent because of Star Wars.
180
 The simple answer is that 
this is not true; instead the patentee will receive the level of abstraction 
that is proportional to his intellectual contribution. The patentee will not 
receive every cure for AIDS because he did not invent an idea that will be 
used in every future cure for AIDS. But to the extent that his novel idea is 
incorporated into future cures (e.g., if the patentee‘s insightful idea is to 
use radiation to cure AIDS and future cures use radiation) then he would 
be compensated to that same extent. 
The third point, perhaps a restatement of the first two, is that this 
automatic rule for selecting the level of abstraction works even when the 
resulting scope is very broad or narrow. For example, suppose that the 
patentee really is the first person to think about using radiation, when 
everyone else was pursuing pills, and that the patentee succeeds with X 
radiation. Suppose that a later improver, seeing the patentee‘s success, 
now changes from researching pills to researching radiation, and discovers 
a better cure using Y radiation. There is no intuitive unfairness in allowing 
the patentee to cover the later improvement. The intuitive assumption is 
that because the patentee‘s teaching induces the later improvement, it is 
fair to demand a share of the resulting benefit. Conversely, if there had 
already been prior suggestions to use 10 rads of X radiation and the 
patentee had merely calibrated a radiation machine to make the suggestion 
work, then he should be limited to his particular calibration and should not 
receive anything broader. 
This intuitive analysis can also be phrased in more economic terms, 
which is why my rule also works within the utilitarian economics 
framework that dominates the patent literature.
181
 Beyond the individualized 
calculation of incentives and monopoly cost, the overarching economic 
theory of patent law is to prevent misappropriation of non-rivalrous and 
otherwise-non-excludable information goods.
182
 This standard rationale 
has two implications. The first is that the fact that patent law protects 
 
 
 180. See infra Part IV.A for more detailed discussion of this objection. 
 181. Kieff, supra note 24, at 697. 
 182. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 25, at 294 (―The conventional rationale for granting legal 
protection to inventions . . . is the difficulty that a producer may encounter in trying to recover his 
fixed costs of research and development.‖); Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent 
Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (2005). 
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information goods means that it should protect the idea, not just the 
specific embodiment or the container for the information. The second is 
that the fact that patent law protects against misappropriation means that 
protection is only proper when the idea is the patentee‘s own. Protecting 
an idea that the patentee really stole from an upstream prior inventor 
merely confers an undue windfall on the patentee. 
C. Implications of the Framework 
The basic doctrinal implication of my proposal is to shift patent scope 
from being primarily governed by doctrines focusing on the specification 
disclosure (§ 112 and the abstract ideas doctrine) to a focus on the novelty 
of the contribution. This can be conceived in some ways as a grand 
bargain: patentees would be relieved from an unpredictable and sometimes 
(when courts feel like it) impossibly onerous disclosure standard, but 
would now face a less generous novelty standard. This section will explain 
each of these components in turn. First, I discuss how the novelty standard 
will be made more demanding to require that the claimed idea itself be 
novel. Second, I discuss how the existing cases on the abstract ideas 
doctrine can be reconceptualized to fit my proposal. Third, I discuss the 
role of § 112 in this new framework. 
1. Abolishing the Enablement Requirement for Prior Art 
The simple way to ensure that the patentee‘s claimed idea is novel is to 
make ideas part of the prior art. This amounts to abolishing the enablement 
requirement for prior art. In one sense, this makes my proposal easy to 
implement, because it only really requires changing one single doctrine. 
At the same time, because the enablement requirement for prior art is 
considered deeply entrenched,
183
 some further justification for the change 
is necessary. 
As an initial matter, it is worth noting that the enablement requirement 
for prior art has no textual support in the statute.
184
 This might be 
considered a rhetorical trick, since the reason for this lack of textual 
support is that the statute provides no definition of prior art at all, 
 
 
 183. See, e.g., Elan Pharm., Inc. v. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Res., 346 F.3d 1051, 1055 
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942). 
 184. Janice M. Mueller & Donald S. Chisum, Enabling Patent Law's Inherent Anticipation 
Doctrine, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1101, 1137 (2008) (―§ 102 of the Patent Act is a patent-defeating 
provision that says nothing at all about enablement. Rather, the courts have read the enablement 
requirement into anticipation under § 102.‖). 
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requiring instead that the invention not be previously ―known‖ by others 
without elaborating on what this means.
185
 The point, however, is that 
courts have created the enablement requirement for prior art based on their 
conceptions of good policy, making the enablement requirement for prior 
art only as legitimate as its policy rationale. And the policy rationale is 
wrong. 
The rationale for the enablement requirement of prior art is that if a 
prior disclosure ―does not inform the art without more how to practice the 
new invention, it has not correspondingly enriched the store of common 
knowledge.‖186 In other words, only embodiments carry social value and 
contribute to society‘s common knowledge. But this is flatly not true. All 
manner of ideas, from Einstein‘s idea of E=mc2 to diagnosing AIDS as a 
distinct disease requiring a cure, contribute to social knowledge without 
the inventor having taught the eventual embodiment (a nuclear power 
plant or a working cure). What the enablement requirement for prior art 
thus fails to recognize is that innovation is a cumulative process.
187
 
Patentees necessarily build on the contributions of prior inventors who 
contributed ideas but not completed embodiments. Allowing patentees to 
perform an upstream capture of prior insights thus unfairly over-rewards 
patentees and denigrates the contributions of upstream inventors. 
Another way of making this point is to say that the policy rationale 
rests on a false dichotomy. It says that because prior inventors concededly 
do not deserve all the credit for the eventual success, then those inventors 
deserve none whatsoever. So because the researchers who diagnosed 
AIDS as a distinct condition requiring cure did not themselves teach how 
to cure it, they deserve no credit for the eventual cure. But there is a big 
difference between claiming all the credit and getting none of it. In 
concrete terms, just because Einstein does not deserve all the credit for the 
eventual creation of nuclear power does not mean that the first creator of a 
nuclear power plant should get it; but by excluding Einstein from the prior 
art, patent law gives all the credit to the power plant builder by default 
 
 
 185. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). 
 186. Dewey, 124 F.2d at 989; see also Seymore, supra note 61, at 959–61 (implicitly using this 
rationale to argue for an even more stringent enablement requirement for prior art, where even ―if the 
document discloses a theoretical method for making X, in the first instance the disclosure would be 
presumed nonenabling‖ absent stronger proof that an ordinary artisan could actually use the disclosed 
method to make an embodiment). 
 187. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation 
Policy, 34 J. CORP. L. 1259, 1261 (2009) (―Innovation is a cumulative process in which today's 
inventors build on the ideas of yesterday's creators.‖). 
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(and then arbitrarily takes back some of it by imposing an ill-defined 
disclosure requirement). 
The other rationale for the enablement requirement for prior art is a 
sense of fairness and symmetry: that for a prior article or book to 
invalidate a later patent, the disclosure ought to have been enough to 
obtain a patent. But this is a fallacious assumption: not everything should 
be patented, and so the fact that a prior thing cannot be patented does not 
mean it cannot limit a subsequent patent. High level scientific ideas like 
E=mc
2
 or the basic idea of curing AIDS fall into this category, because 
there are preexisting incentives outside of the patent system to discover 
them, and thus granting patents would be wasteful as well as creating high 
monopoly costs.
188
 
Ultimately, not even current law embraces this fairness and symmetry 
rationale, as the court made clear in In re Hafner:
189
 
In essence, appellant is contending that a double standard should not 
be applied in determining the adequacy of a disclosure to anticipate 
under § 102, on the one hand, and to support the patentability of a 
claim under § 112 on the other. He feels that a disclosure adequate 
for the one purpose is necessarily adequate for the other but, 
unhappily for him, this is not so.
190
 
What courts hold is that the enablement requirement for prior art requires 
less stringent disclosure than what is required under § 112 to obtain a 
patent,
191
 though how much less is never made very clear. The point is that 
once this concession—that not everything anticipatory must be itself 
patentable—is made, the fairness and symmetry rationale collapses. And 
no other rationale appears to support the enablement requirement for prior 
art. 
The fairness and symmetry rationale can also be understood as resting 
on a false dichotomy. Implicit in the rationale is the intuition that unless 
 
 
 188. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126–27 (2006) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari). This is particularly reflected by the fact that the 
inventors of high level ideas voluntarily disclose the knowledge even when such disclosure creates a 
statutory bar to patenting. See Alan Devlin & Neel Sukhatme, Self-Realizing Inventions and the 
Utilitarian Foundation of Patent Law, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 897 (2009) (arguing that ―self-
realizing‖ inventions should be unpatentable). 
 189. 410 F.2d 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 190. Id. at 1405; see also Rasmusson v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 413 F.3d 1318, 1325 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (―The standard for what constitutes proper enablement of a prior art reference for purposes 
of anticipation under section 102 . . . differs from the enablement standard under section 112.‖). 
 191. SRI Int‘l, Inc. v. Internet Sec. Sys., Inc., 511 F.3d 1186, 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that 
―the record meets the lower enablement standard for prior art‖). 
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the patentee can capture the preexisting idea—all telegraphs, all 
telephones, and all airplanes—the patentee will receive nothing. But, as 
has already been emphasized, this is not true. The patentee‘s achievement 
of creating a new embodiment demonstrates that there is a contribution, 
and potentially a very great contribution—just not to the full extent of the 
preexisting idea. Rather, the contribution is a narrower insight, one that is 
often still very valuable for both society and the patentee. In the case of 
Morse, the insight was the use of relay stations to re-transmit signals in the 
telegraph,
192
 as well as Morse Code;
193
 in the case of Bell, the insight was 
continuous electric current that mimicked sound waves;
194
 and in the case 
of the Wright brothers the insight was using a rudder for flight control.
195
 
In each of these historical cases the patentee ultimately received protection 
closely corresponding to their actual insight,
196
 and in each case they were 
well remunerated.
197
 The next sub-section provides a more detailed 
discussion of how my proposal provides a better explanation for historical 
case outcomes than standard disclosure theory. 
2. Reconceptualizing the Abstract Idea Doctrine 
Another area where my proposal might seem to create significant 
conflict with existing law is with the doctrine that ideas cannot be 
patented. One response is that the current doctrine is already so incoherent 
that nothing can really conflict with it. More helpfully, my proposal offers 
a way to reconcile the case law in the area, showing that the outcomes 
reflect sensible policy even if the rhetoric and doctrine does not. In my 
paradigm, the problem with Morse‘s claim is not that it was too abstract, it 
is that it was old. In comparison to Morse, Bell‘s claim was equally 
abstract, but it was new. This does not fully resolve the tension between 
 
 
 192. See VLADIMIR GUREVICH, ELECTRIC RELAYS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 11–13 (2006) 
(describing history and how Morse arguably derived the idea from Joseph Henry). 
 193. Id. at 8 (stating that Morse ―believed that patents were to be granted not for fine theories but 
for constructing practical applications and it was he who applied and joined theory with practice‖). 
 194. See infra text accompanying notes 206–13. 
 195. Padfield & Lawrence, supra note 21, at 698. 
 196. O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853) (upholding Morse‘s first seven claims, 
including the fourth claim to relays, and fifth claim to Morse Code); Dolbear v. Bell Atl. Tel. Co., 126 
U.S. 1, 544 (1888) (construing Bell‘s claim to be limited to continuous electric current); Wright Co. v. 
Paulhan, 177 F. 261, 264 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), rev’d on other grounds, 180 F. 112 (2d Cir. 1910) 
(interpreting claim to cover any means where a rudder, which controls yaw, is linked to roll). 
 197. See RICHARD WINEFIELD, NEVER THE TWAIN SHALL MEET: BELL, GALLAUDET, AND THE 
COMMUNICATIONS DEBATE 21 (1987); George E. Frost, Let’s Remember Sam, 76 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC‘Y 277, 279 (1994); End Patent Wars of Aircraft Makers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
1917.  
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my proposal and the statutory text that conceptualizes the invention as an 
embodiment, but the point is that current doctrine already allows ideas—
thinly disguised as embodiments described abstractly—to be patented. The 
protection of ideas is necessary to provide adequate economic incentives. 
The tension is not between the statutory text and my proposal; it is 
between the statutory text and economic reality. 
The difference between my proposal and current doctrine is only that 
my proposal is transparent about protecting ideas, while current law 
fudges the issue, contradicts itself, and causes confusion. There is no 
meaningful difference in the scope of a monopoly whether denominated as 
claiming ―the idea of airplanes as machines that fly‖ or ―an airplane 
embodiment,‖ when the latter is then interpreted to encompass every 
airplane that will ever be made, sold, or used.
198
 Current claiming 
technique purports to describe an embodiment, but really covers an idea 
through the process of abstraction. Courts that both acknowledge
199
 and 
deny
200
 that ideas are the basis of patent protection cause only endless 
confusion. 
In contrast to this jumbled mess, my proposal offers a conceptually 
coherent way to reconcile the case law by looking to see whether the idea 
being claimed is new or old. A new look at the classic contrast between 
Morse and Bell illustrates how this rule brings coherence to the area, 
reflects good policy outcomes, and fits existing case law, all at the same 
time. 
In Morse, the claimed abstraction/idea was the use of electric current to 
communicate printed characters at a distance.
201
 Evaluated as an idea, the 
idea was old, even though no one had built an embodiment to achieve it. 
As the Court noted in its decision, ―[V]ery soon after the discovery [of 
electromagnetism] by Oersted [in 1820], it was believed by men of science 
that this newly-discovered power might be used to communicate 
intelligence to distant places.‖202 The Court also noted that by ―the year 
1832, when Professor Morse appears to have devoted himself to the 
subject, the conviction was general among men of science everywhere that 
the object could, and sooner or later would be, accomplished.‖203 In the 
 
 
 198. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (defining infringement as making, using, and selling the invention). 
 199. Gill v. United States, 160 U.S. 426, 434 (1896) (―In every case the idea conceived is the 
invention.‖). 
 200. Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (―An idea of itself is not 
patentable . . . .‖). 
 201. Morse, 56 U.S. at 112. 
 202. Id. at 107. 
 203. Id. 
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Court‘s eyes, Morse‘s insight was not the use of electric current to print 
characters: his insights were much more narrowly directed to how to make 
a specific apparatus for achieving this old idea. To give Morse the broader 
preexisting idea would have taken knowledge out of the public domain.
204
 
In contrast to Morse, who did not invent his claimed idea, there is a 
much stronger argument that Bell‘s conceptual insight was precisely what 
he claimed. Although the idea of a telephone was preexisting, Bell did not 
claim all telephones. Instead, he claimed all telephones using continuous 
electric current.
205
 And Bell‘s breakthrough insight, at least according to 
the evidence before the Court, was precisely the idea of using continuous 
current in a telephone.
206
 
This point requires some historical context. Prior to Bell, a German 
inventor named Phillip Reis had already created an electric device that 
could convey musical sounds.
207
 The Reis device did not work properly as 
a telephone because it would distort speech to the point of making it 
unintelligible. Nonetheless, others in the field assumed that Reis had the 
best overall approach—people assumed that the lack of success was due 
―to the imperfect mechanism of the apparatus used, rather than to any fault 
in the principle.‖208 
Bell‘s major conceptual breakthrough was understanding that Reis‘s 
―failure was due not to workmanship, but to the principle.‖ 209  Reis‘s 
device used intermittent current, which Bell found ―could not be made 
under any circumstances to reproduce the delicate forms of the air 
vibrations caused by the human voice in articulate speech.‖210  Bell‘s 
insight was to then operate the current continuously while varying its 
intensity, which he called ―undulatory current.‖211 Unlike Morse, who did 
not invent the idea of electromagnetism for telegraphs, Bell did invent the 
idea of using ―electrical undulations‖ for telephones, which he included in 
his claim. The Supreme Court further tightened this nexus when it made 
clear that the claim language of ―electrical undulations‖ meant that the 
patent covered only telephones using continuous electric current.
212
 As the 
 
 
 204. Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966) (―Congress may not authorize the 
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain . . . .‖). 
 205. Dolbear v. Bell Atl. Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888). 
 206. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 95 (―[U]nlike Morse, Bell limited even his broad 
fifth claim in a way that corresponded to his specific contribution to the technology.‖). 
 207. Id. at 96. 
 208. Bell, 126 U.S. at 544. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 13, 544. 
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Court stated, this idea ―was [Bell‘s] discovery, and it was new. Reis never 
thought of it, and he failed to transmit speech telegraphically. Bell did, and 
he succeeded.‖213 To take an analogy, this is like saying that prior to Bell 
everyone thought that pills were the best approach, and were quibbling 
over only different chemical formulas. Bell came along and showed that 
pills were the wrong approach, and suggested using radiation instead. The 
Court then gave Bell every type of radiation, including those that he had 
not specifically taught—because Bell taught the idea of radiation. 
The critical difference between Bell and Morse, then, is that Alexander 
Graham Bell invented the idea of using continuous electric current in 
telephones, and received precisely that idea.
214
 Samuel Morse did not 
invent the idea of using electric current in telegraphs, and his claim to that 
was denied. Notably, Morse did invent some other very abstract ideas, 
such as Morse Code, which is so abstract that it is only a system of signs 
and signals that can be implemented in an almost-infinite number of 
undisclosed ways. Yet despite invoking the abstract idea doctrine to 
invalidate the claim to electromagnetic transmission in the very same case, 
the Court summarily upheld the claim to Morse Code.
215
 
Three points come from this comparison of a classic duo of cases that 
have puzzled patent lawyers for generations. The first is that my rule 
provides a much better fit with actual case outcomes than current doctrine. 
The phenomenon of abstract claims that exceed the embodiments taught 
by the specification is ubiquitous;
216
 current doctrine cannot explain why 
some such abstract claims are upheld (Bell), while others are invalidated 
(Morse). My rule, focused on the novelty of the idea, matches outcomes 
exactly. 
The second point is that this correspondence between my rule and 
outcomes is not based on an elaborate post hoc reconstruction with 
extraneous facts that re-litigates history, but instead come from facts that 
the Court took pains to note and thus presumably were important to its 
decisions. The Morse Court notes that ―men of science everywhere‖ knew 
of the idea of an electric telegraph and expected it to be reduced to practice 
 
 
 213. Id. at 545. 
 214. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 6, at 96 (―[E]ven Bell‘s broadest claim was still tightly 
correlated to his own contribution to the art.‖). 
 215. O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 86 (1853) (Morse‘s fifth claim to ―the system of 
signs, consisting of dots and spaces, and of dots, spaces, and horizontal lines, for numerals, letters, 
words, or sentences, substantially as herein set forth‖); id. at 112 (sustaining claim). 
 216. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (―[A]n issue common to many patent disputes [is] 
claims that are broader than the disclosed embodiments.‖). 
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eventually.
217
 The Bell Court notes that Reis had never thought of 
continuous electric current.
218
 Yet under the formal doctrine that emanates 
from these cases, none of these recited facts matter. Whether others had 
thought of the underlying idea is completely irrelevant under current law, 
since even if the idea had been articulated, that evidence would be 
excludable given the enablement requirement for prior art. What this 
suggests is that the Court intuitively grasped the policy importance of this 
consideration—the newness of the idea—but was inarticulate in describing 
its importance and found it difficult to fit within a preexisting doctrinal 
framework (both common law and statutory) that was embodiment-
centric. 
The third point is that the Court likely found these facts to be 
intuitively important (even if it could not articulate why) because these 
facts are important from a social policy perspective. As discussed above, 
the underlying economic purpose of patent law is to prevent competitors 
from appropriating the patentee‘s idea, not the embodiment.219 But this 
only holds to the extent that the idea is original to the patentee. The 
newness of the idea thus should be, and appears to have in fact been 
(though unarticulated in doctrine), the paramount consideration in 
assessing the patentee‘s contribution and appropriate reward. 
3. Untying Patent Scope from Disclosure 
The third implication of my proposal is that it unties patent scope from 
disclosure, so § 112 will no longer restrain patent scope. It must be 
admitted at the start that this can be seen as somewhat radical: the view 
that patent scope depends on the amount of disclosure is deeply 
embedded.
220
 This is most aptly demonstrated by the Supreme Court‘s 
statement that disclosure is the ―quid pro quo‖ of the right to exclude.221 In 
the conventional view, more disclosure of more embodiments means more 
exclusion.
222
 
 
 
 217. Morse, 56 U.S. at 107. 
 218. Bell, 126 U.S. at 544. 
 219. See supra text accompanying notes 181–82. 
 220. Merges & Nelson, supra note 14, at 844–45 (quid pro quo is ―built deep into the history of 
patent law‖). 
 221. J.E.M. Ag. Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int‘l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001) (quoting 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 484 (1974)); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (―What is claimed by the patent application 
must be the same as what is disclosed in the specification . . . .‖).  
 222. See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (disclosure of nine genera of 
cyanobacteria not enough); Lemley et al., supra note 39, at 1330 (characterizing the § 112 inquiry as 
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The starting point of this Article, however, is that patent law‘s scope 
problems will never be resolved under the disclosure framework. 
Predictable rules cannot rest on vague generalities that ―more‖ disclosure 
will mean ―more‖ exclusion; it requires defining what kind of disclosure 
results in what kind of exclusion. If I disclose ten particular tables, what 
kind of claim will I be entitled to? And, as seen in Part II.A.1, once we 
look for a concrete rule, it turns out that § 112 provides no answers 
because it is mired in self-contradiction. To the extent that the quid pro 
quo means that the patentee must disclose every embodiment that is 
claimed (if I disclose ten different tables, I get only those specific tables 
down to the last nut, bolt and paint color), it creates impossibly narrow 
patents. To the extent that the quid pro quo instead means disclosing one 
embodiment and claiming the entire class (if I disclose ten tables, I may 
claim every table), it imposes no meaningful limit on patent scope. And to 
the extent it means something in between, the test is incoherent. 
Under my proposal, the only thing that § 112 will require is a single 
working embodiment,
223
 and from this single embodiment the patentee can 
claim the broadest novel idea contained therein. In other words, I would 
adopt the more patentee-friendly line of cases for § 112. In exchange—in 
order to prevent unlimited claiming—I would impose a stronger novelty 
limit to restrain patent scope. 
Of course, in one sense my proposal will still require ―disclosure.‖ The 
patentee must still disclose one working embodiment and the underlying 
ideas and principles that allow that embodiment to be successfully made 
and used. But I call my theory a ―novelty‖ theory because it is 
conceptually very different from disclosure theory, where ―disclosure‖ is 
synonymous with the disclosure of multiple numbers of embodiments.
224
 
The question under my proposal is no longer how many embodiments or 
even how many ideas are being disclosed, but whether the idea being 
disclosed and claimed is new. 
 
 
―whether one could make the embodiments claimed‖). 
 223. To clarify, all my proposal does is regulate patent scope, so disclosing a single embodiment 
will be enough to sustain a claim to an idea of much broader scope. But § 112 also has other 
requirements that do not regulate scope but instead govern whether a patent will issue at all, such as 
the best mode requirement and the requirement that a disclosed embodiment be working as opposed to 
inoperative. In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863 (Fed. Cir. 2000). My proposal would not affect those 
requirements. 
 224. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. 
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4. The Role of Non-obviousness 
An idea has to be more than technically ―new‖ to be patentable; it must 
also be non-obvious.
225
 It is important to understand in this context that 
when patent law speaks of something as ―new,‖ it means that the exact 
same thing has not been previously disclosed.
226
 If a prior art book 
contains the words ―a table with four legs,‖ any reasonable person would 
immediately understand that a table with five legs would work just as well. 
But patent law would treat a table with five legs as technically new, 
because it has not been literally disclosed. Obviousness then comes in to 
solve the problem by including within the prior art not only the literal 
disclosure, but also what people would reasonably understand from 
reading a reference.
227
 Because any reasonable person would immediately 
understand the idea of a table with five legs from reading the words ―a 
table with four legs,‖ a table with five legs is also considered part of the 
prior art because it is obvious.
228
 
Under my proposal, non-obviousness would function identically as it 
does now, except the enablement requirement for prior art would no longer 
apply. Practically speaking, the two inquiries are easily separable. Under 
current law, a determination of obviousness on the five-legged table 
entails two distinct inquiries: (1) asking whether a five-legged table is 
obvious given the articulation of a four-legged table;
229
 and (2) asking 
whether the prior art teaches how to make a five-legged table.
230
 My 
proposal keeps the first step unchanged, and abolishes the second step. 
 
 
 225. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006) (defining obviousness). 
 226. Old Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 635 F.3d 539, 544 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (reiterating 
the ―every element‖ rule). 
 227. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (―[O]bvious variants of 
prior art references are themselves part of the public domain.‖). 
 228. It is worth noting that obviousness is not simply another iteration of the abstraction process. 
Articulating ―a table with four legs‖ would also articulate the idea of ―tables‖ in the abstract, and it 
happens to make a table with five legs obvious. But the articulation of a higher level of abstraction 
(―tables‖) does not always make every lower level of abstraction obvious (―tables with X legs‖). For 
example, it does not make the idea of a table with one leg obvious, since people might initially assume 
that a table with one leg would fall over and thus find the concept difficult to imagine. The difference 
means that my solution to the abstraction problem does not readily carry over to addressing the 
problems in obviousness doctrine. 
 229. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (―A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically 
disclosed . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious . . . .‖). 
 230. See In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (―[I]n order to render an invention 
unpatentable for obviousness, the prior art must enable a person of ordinary skill to make and use the 
invention.‖). 
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A familiar problem with the non-obviousness standard is its fuzzy 
boundaries.
231
 Giving more precision to the obviousness doctrine, however, 
is not the task of this Article. I have elsewhere suggested ways to give 
obviousness doctrine more conceptual and practical coherence.
232
 For 
present purposes, it is enough to note that while perfect clarity would be 
best, having only one fuzzy doctrine is better than having two. 
IV. RESPONSES TO POSSIBLE CONCERNS 
A. The Science Fiction Objection 
The science fiction objection is that, under my proposal, science fiction 
writers who are the first to describe imaginary devices like warp drives 
and time machines would patent those ideas, and preempt the hardworking 
later inventors who actually reduce those devices to practice. This actually 
comprises two analytically distinct arguments, which I will address in 
turn. 
1. Science Fiction Writers Preempting Later Patents 
The first argument is that a work of science fiction, such as Star Wars 
depicting hyperdrives for interstellar travel, would deprive the later 
inventor of a real working hyperdrive of his reward. This is a more 
plainspoken way of reiterating the classic argument in favor of the 
enablement requirement for prior art. The intuition is that the hardworking 
inventor who contributes the working embodiment (either by actual 
building or constructive teaching) should receive a patent.
233
 
As described in Part III.C.1, the response to this objection is that it rests 
on a false dichotomy.
234
 The implicit assumption is that the only alternative 
to awarding no patent to the first builder of a hyperdrive (a concededly bad 
outcome) is award him a patent covering all hyperdrives. This is simply 
not true. Rather, the inventor of the first hyperdrive will be able to 
describe his faster-than-light-device on many levels of abstraction. This 
point is counter-intuitive today because it is hard to imagine all the 
 
 
 231. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d. Cir. 1950) (commenting that 
obviousness is ―as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in the whole 
paraphernalia of legal concepts‖). 
 232. Tun-Jen Chiang, A Cost-Benefit Approach to Patent Obviousness, 82 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 39 
(2008). 
 233. See supra text accompanying note 61; see generally Mueller & Chisum, supra note 184, at 
1134–37 (providing a history of the development of the enablement requirement for prior art). 
 234. See supra text accompanying notes 192–96. 
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different levels. The highest level is easy to imagine because it has already 
been articulated: all hyperdrives. Conversely, the lower levels have not 
been articulated clearly and thus are harder to describe: how will that 
hyperdrive travel faster than the speed of light? Will it use wormholes or 
something else? In short, we cannot easily describe lower levels of 
abstraction, such as wormhole-hyperdrives versus Alcubierre-drives, 
precisely because those sub-ideas have not been articulated yet.
235
  
This actually demonstrates the beauty of my proposal. The inventor 
will get rewarded precisely for having the mental breakthrough that is so 
hard to imagine today. And this makes perfect sense: if the breakthrough 
were easy, we would have it already, and that means that the idea requires 
no patent incentives to create. Thus, the idea of hyperdrives in the abstract 
should not be patentable, because George Lucas (and many others) could 
articulate that idea without any patent incentives at all. What society needs 
patent incentives to reward are the more specific ideas on how to create a 
hyperdrive, which people cannot readily imagine today. 
It is important to emphasize that for any embodiment that would 
receive a patent today, there always is a conceptual breakthrough that 
allows it to receive a patent under my proposal.
236
 The conceptual 
breakthrough is what makes the embodiment ―non-obvious.‖ This leads to 
a corollary, which is that the only time that a work of science fiction will 
completely preempt a later patent is when there is no insight (i.e., when 
the work of science fiction so fully describes the patentee‘s device that it 
amounts to a blueprint). But in those circumstances, preempting the 
patentee is not a bad thing, and under current law the patent would also be 
invalid.
237
 If the earlier work has fully described how to make a working 
device with so much detail that it amounts to a blueprint for the later 
patentee, then a patentee who merely builds the device has contributed 
nothing worth rewarding.
238
 Even under the enablement requirement for 
prior art, science fiction has invalidated patents when they provided 
 
 
 235. The paradox goes deeper. I am able to articulate the sub-ideas of wormhole-hyperdrives and 
Alcubierre-drives, to demonstrate that the ―hyperdrive‖ is not an indivisible concept but has multiple 
levels of abstraction. But I cannot articulate the actual breakthrough idea that an eventual inventor 
would be able to patent. If I could, the idea would not be a breakthrough, and it would not deserve a 
patent. 
 236. See supra text accompanying note 180. 
 237. See Cohesive Techs., Inc. v. Waters Corp., 543 F.3d 1351, 1364 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (noting 
that an ancient alchemy textbook can invalidate a patent on an alloy if it ―describes a method that, if 
practiced precisely, actually produces the claimed alloy‖). 
 238. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1850) (requiring more skill than 
―possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business‖ to obtain a patent). 
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sufficient detail to act as this kind of blueprint.
239
 In this sense, my 
proposal does not grant more or fewer patents than current law. 
Consequently, it does not deny inventors of non-obvious things like 
hyperdrives a patent. 
2. Science Fiction Writers Obtaining Their Own Patent 
The second argument is that science fiction writers would be able to 
obtain their own patent. My proposal would not allow this, however, 
because it still requires a patentee to describe at least one working 
embodiment. This is both for legalistic and policy reasons. 
The legalistic reason is that § 112 on its face requires the patent 
specification to teach how to make the invention, and it clearly means an 
embodiment in this context.
240
 And the Supreme Court has held in Brenner 
v. Manson that the usefulness requirement of § 101 also requires a 
working embodiment.
241
 Thus, while the requirement for prior artists to 
create a working embodiment has no statutory basis,
242
 the requirement for 
patentees to create a working embodiment unquestionably does.  
The policy reason is that the ideas of science fiction writers do not 
usually need patent incentives.
243
 This is different from the fallacious 
notion that underlies the enablement requirement for prior art, that prior 
ideas have no value at all unless they came with embodiments. Rather, the 
point is that some ideas can be extremely socially valuable, but require no 
patent incentives to induce them.
244
 For example, the idea of E=mc
2
 is 
very valuable, but Einstein developed it even without patent incentives. 
And E=mc
2
 is actually a close call: the objection is surely not that Einstein 
might receive a patent, but that science fiction writers imagining airplanes 
and hyperdrives will. The reason that the objection has stronger intuitive 
force in the airplane and hyperdrive context is that those ideas are easy—
almost anyone can come up with the bare idea. But the easier an idea is, 
the less likely that idea will itself receive a patent under my proposal. 
 
 
 239. Daniel H. Brean, Keeping Time Machines and Teleporters in the Public Domain: Fiction as 
Prior Art for Patent Examination, 7 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL‘Y 5, at *3–4 (2007) (giving examples 
where fiction has fully anticipated a later patent). 
 240. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
 241. 383 U.S. 519, 534–35 (1966). 
 242. Mueller & Chisum, supra note 184, at 1137. 
 243. Devlin & Sukhatme, supra note 188, at 917–18 (arguing that we should not grant patent 
rights when the same invention would have been created even without such rights). 
 244. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of Patentability, 120 
YALE L.J. 1590 (2011) (arguing for the use of an ―inducement‖ standard to determine whether 
something should be patented); Chiang, supra note 232, at 57–72. 
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Precisely because everyone can imagine an airplane, the idea of an 
airplane will be articulated well before the first person can actually 
produce an embodiment and file a patent. This is not saying that the idea 
of an airplane is valueless—it is essential and thus valuable—but that it is 
easy to come up with the high-level idea by itself. What is hard is the 
lower-level ideas for achieving flight control, which then lead to a 
working airplane, and it is these lower-level ideas that I would protect.
245
 
At first blush, this analysis might suggest that the enablement 
requirement for prior art has a sound intuition after all: prior ideas might 
have value, but it is not the kind of value that patent law needs to 
recognize and protect. But this would be a mistake. What my analysis 
suggests is that highly abstract ideas like the hyperdrive and flying 
machines do not need patent incentives (because they are easy to imagine) 
and thus should belong to the public domain. What the enablement 
requirement for prior art does, in contrast, is give them to a later patentee 
who creates one embodiment. By excluding the fact that everyone had 
thought of the idea of airplanes, the patentee can now claim this as his own 
new idea. By excluding the fact that Einstein invented the idea of E=mc
2
, 
patent law gives it to the later person who builds a nuclear power plant (an 
embodiment of the idea that E=mc
2
).
246
 This gives an undue windfall to 
patentees at the public‘s expense. The fact that disclosure theory then 
allows this windfall to be taken back, but only at a judge‘s arbitrary 
discretion, obviously does not make the situation any better. 
Under my proposal, the ideas that do not need patent incentives would 
be automatically sifted out by the novelty mechanism. The first person to 
imagine airplanes did not succeed in building one. The first person to 
imagine a hyperdrive will not be successful in building one. By requiring a 
working embodiment, I limit patentable ideas only to those that are 
sufficiently difficult to conceive that they require patent incentives to 
protect and reward. Once this is satisfied, however, patent scope should be 
defined by the novel idea and should not be limited to the embodiment. At 
 
 
 245. See Overview of the Wright Brothers Invention Process, NAT‘L AERONAUTICS & SPACE 
ADMIN., http://wright.nasa.gov/overview.htm (last visited May 26, 2012) (―They decided that control 
of the flying aircraft would be the most crucial and hardest problem to solve and they had some ideas 
for solving that problem.‖). 
 246. As a matter of historical reality, Enrico Fermi did receive a very broad patent, though not 
quite covering every nuclear reaction. But he received relatively little monetary compensation because, 
ironically, the patent was so essential to atomic power that the U.S. government forced Fermi to sell it 
to the government at a low price. See generally Simone Turchetti, ―For Slow Neutrons, Slow Pay‖: 
Enrico Fermi’s Patent and the U.S. Atomic Energy Program, 1938–1953, 97 ISIS 1 (2006) (describing 
history of the Fermi patent). 
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the same time, inventors also should not be able to capture upstream ideas, 
like the general idea of hyperdrives or airplanes, and remove those ideas 
from the public domain. 
B. The Imprecision of Ideas 
A second objection to allowing the patenting of ideas is that ideas are 
thought to be particularly vague and imprecise, so that the boundaries of 
the patent monopoly would be rendered unclear.
247
 Clear boundaries for 
property rights like patents, of course, are generally considered 
desirable.
248
 But allowing patents to cover the inventor‘s insight is not in 
tension with this goal. 
The simple reason is that today‘s claims already cover ideas; they are 
just not called such.
249
 For example, a run-of-the-mill claim to a table—
―an apparatus comprising a flat surface and legs‖—covers every table or 
the idea of tables in general, rather than any specific table embodiment. 
All my proposal does is regulate the permissible scope of claims; it does 
not require any change to claim style.
250
 To the extent that claims are 
tolerably clear today, they will continue to be under my proposal (and to 
the extent that they are not,
251
 that problem will continue too, but is 
beyond the scope of this Article to address). 
One major benefit of my proposal, however, is to address uncertainty 
in claim interpretation that is not caused by linguistic indeterminacy, but 
by conflicts in doctrine or legal indeterminacy. An example will illustrate. 
Suppose that a patentee writes a claim that facially covers all tables—―an 
apparatus comprising a flat surface and legs‖—but in the specification 
describes only wooden tables with four legs. Under current doctrine, a 
court will often find this claim ambiguous. The theory is that although the 
claim facially covers all tables, the patentee has only described one table 
in the specification, and judges think that the patentee cannot really mean 
to claim all tables when he has not described every table.
252
 The judges 
then ―interpret‖ the claim that, on its face, would cover all tables to really 
 
 
 247. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 143, at 200 (attributing the problem of uncertainty to abstract 
claims). 
 248. Chiang, supra note 160, at 525. 
 249. See supra Part I.B. 
 250. In particular, my proposal does not require changing to central claiming. Cf. Burk & Lemley, 
supra note 99, at 1783–84. 
 251. See, e.g., id. at 1748–65 (arguing that today‘s claims are insolubly ambiguous). 
 252. See, e.g., Netword, LLC v. Centraal Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (―The 
claims are directed to the invention that is described in the specification; they do not have meaning 
removed from the context from which they arose.‖). 
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cover only wooden tables with four legs.
253
 Other judges then protest that 
the claim plainly covers every table.
254
 
It should be obvious that this extremely frequent fact pattern
255
 is not 
really about textual interpretation at all. There is nothing particularly 
textually ambiguous about claims that cover every table. What the judges 
are really fighting about is whether a claim that covers every table should 
be permitted, or in other words about the legally permissible scope. Claim 
interpretation is simply bootstrapping off the claim validity issue—when a 
judge thinks that a patentee cannot really mean to claim every table 
despite the facially clear language, that is because he thinks a claim 
covering every table would be invalid.
256
 The legal indeterminacy arises 
from the same levels of abstraction problem as described in Part II. By 
providing a predictable and intuitively appealing rule for valid scope, my 
proposal would also resolve these proxy conflicts. In this way it would 
actually reduce the indeterminacy of claims, a subject on which much ink 
has been spilled.
257
 To be sure, some claims are linguistically indeterminate 
in addition to being legally indeterminate, and my proposal does little to 
resolve that problem. But having one problem is better than having two. 
 
 
 253. See, e.g., Retractable Techs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 653 F.3d 1296, 1305 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (interpreting the word ―body‖ to really mean ―a one-piece body‖ because this is what the 
―inventor actually invented‖). 
 254. See id. at 1313 (Rader, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that ―body‖ covers bodies made from 
multiple pieces); see generally McCarty v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 160 U.S. 110, 116 (1895) (―[I]f we 
once begin to include elements not mentioned in the claim, in order to limit such claim . . . , we should 
never know where to stop.‖). 
 255. See Lizardtech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (―[A]n issue common to many patent disputes 
[is] claims that are broader than the disclosed embodiments.‖); see, e.g., Marine Polymer Techs., Inc. 
v. Hemcon, Inc., No. 2010-1548, slip op. at 6, 11–14 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 15, 2012) (en banc) (whether 
claim to a ―biocompatible poly-β-1→4-N-acetylglucosamine . . . which has an elution test score of 2‖ 
really means a poly-β-1→4-N-acetylglucosamine with an elution test score of zero, as this is the score 
in the specification); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (whether 
claim to ―steel baffles‖ really means steel baffles aligned at the angles described in the specification). 
 256. See SuperGuide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870, 896 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Michel, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that accepting the plain claim language would result in coverage ―far beyond 
what the named inventors say they actually invented in their application, and what it describes and 
enables‖). 
 257. See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent Litigation: The 
Time Is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 202–17 
(2001); Burk & Lemley, supra note 99, at 1748–65; Russell B. Hill & Frank P. Cote, Ending the 
Federal Circuit Crapshoot: Emphasizing Plain Meaning in Patent Claim Interpretation, 42 IDEA 1, 2 
(2002); Kimberly A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 233, 239 (2005).  
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C. The Over- and Under-Inclusiveness of a Rule 
A third objection is that the patentee‘s insight might not always lead to 
the economically optimal patent scope, in that my rule will result in over- 
and under-reward of a patentee in individual cases. For example, one 
might argue that the first inventor of one working cure for AIDS should 
receive all future cures for AIDS, because the immediate need to have 
even one cure is so pressing. In comparison to the immediate benefit, 
paying monopoly prices and being deprived of later (possibly better) cures 
might be considered a relatively bearable cost.
258
 Thus, at least for a patent 
on the first cure for AIDS, one might argue that a higher level of 
abstraction is warranted under an economic balancing of incentives and 
monopoly costs. 
The difficulty of this objection is that it implicitly assumes there is 
some way to measure the economic costs and benefits directly for 
individual patents. Without reliable empirical data on the incentive 
benefits and monopoly costs of the patent, the argument degrades into 
nothing more than uninformed speculation. And patent law fundamentally 
assumes that such direct measurement is not possible, since otherwise it 
would be better to abolish the patent system and award cash prizes 
instead.
259
 As Louis Kaplow has explained: 
[T]he more one attempts to vary the patent life and the rules of 
exploitation industry by industry and case by case, the less 
compelling becomes the justification for rewarding invention 
through a patent system at all. In theory, direct reward systems are 
preferable because they avoid the monopoly costs associated with a 
general patent system. A central reason for reliance on a patent 
system is that it is thought to be too difficult to determine the 
appropriate level of reward fairly and accurately on a case-by-case 
basis.
260
 
 
 
 258. JOHN W. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 1.04[6][a] (2002) 
(―The only product ‗monopolized‘ and sold at too low quantities is a product that would have been 
sold in even lower quantity—zero—if there were no ‗monopoly.‘‖). 
 259. Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 
1137, 1140 (1998) (―[F]inancing research with monopoly profits . . . is generically less efficient than 
financing research through tax revenue.‖). On patent prizes, see generally Michael Abramowicz, 
Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115 (2003); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: 
Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 123 (1997). 
 260. Kaplow, supra note 27, at 1844. 
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I am not saying that my proposed rule will not create such individual case-
by-case errors—it will. As the rules-versus-standards literature has 
established, some amount of over- and under-inclusiveness error is 
inevitable with any type of rule.
261
 To point out individual errors, however, 
is not a good way to assess the merits of having a legal rule. The proper 
point of comparison is with another feasible alternative,
262
 where the 
alternative can provide some systematic approach that produces better 
results overall. The two obvious points of comparison are a regime where 
the embodiment-centric quid pro quo rule was enforced strictly so that 
patentees were limited to their specification embodiments,
263
 or a free-for-
all regime where judges simply engaged in economic balancing. As 
described in Part II, neither alternative is satisfactory. 
D. A Rebuttable Presumption as an Extension 
One possible (though, as we shall see, far from definitive) exception to 
the foregoing analysis pertains to the pharmaceutical sector. The problem 
here is that pharmaceutical research involves a large element of trial-and-
error. If I want to find a chemical pill that cures AIDS, there are billions or 
trillions of potential candidates. Someone can easily generate a gigantic 
list of all of these potential candidates using a computer. The problem here 
is that all of these candidates would then be considered ―articulated,‖ but 
only one or a few of them will actually work. Thus, when an inventor 
eventually—after extreme amounts of trial-and-error testing—finds the 
one compound that works, he will discover that the compound is already 
buried within a gigantic list generated by someone else, and therefore 
receive no patent. And in this case there really might be no patent: there 
might not be a lower level of abstraction, because the same gigantic list 
can also specify all the other details such as the uses for the compound 
(just list every known disease) and the methods of making them (listing 
every known manufacturing method). Because all the real work occurs 
with trial-and-error testing and not the initial conception of the chemical 
formula—which can just be done by computer—the result seems perverse. 
 
 
 261. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. 
REV. 22, 62–69 (1992) (describing trade-offs between rules and standards). 
 262. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 
(1969) (criticizing ―[t]he view that now pervades much public policy economics implicitly presents the 
relevant choice as between an ideal norm and an existing ‗imperfect‘ institutional arrangement‖). 
Winston Churchill made the point more colorfully with his observation that democracy is a terrible 
form of government, except in comparison to the alternatives. 
 263. See supra text accompanying notes 82–86. 
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From the perspective of balancing incentives benefits against monopoly 
costs, surely granting no patent at all would be sub-optimal. The corollary 
is that perhaps a free-for-all judicial balancing regime would be better than 
one that would systematically produce results of zero scope. 
I concede this to be a serious problem.
264
 But it is not a problem with 
my proposal, in the sense that the exact same problem exists under current 
law and under the enablement requirement for prior art.
265
 As Sean 
Seymore has explained, the enablement requirement for prior art is usually 
easily satisfied by a bare list of chemical formulas, because it is considered 
easy to synthesize a compound after knowing its chemical formula.
266
 Of 
course, the real difficulty lies in testing each of millions or billions of 
compounds to show that the compound works, but the enablement 
requirement for prior art does not require that a prior reference test or 
prove the compound‘s usefulness.267 Keeping current law would thus not 
solve this problem.
268
 To the extent that the patent system today has 
survived without someone gaming the rule to mass-produce computer-
generated lists of chemical compounds and foreclose future patents,
269
 it 
can be expected to survive under my proposed rule as well. 
Generalizing from this specific instance, the problem is that patent law 
traditionally seeks only to incentivize conduct up to a discrete point in 
time, which it denotes as ―conception‖ and defines as the formation of a 
complete mental picture of the invention.
270
 As Ted Sichelman has pointed 
out, what this standard means is that patent law inherently assumes that the 
many steps on the road to commercialization that occur after conception—
 
 
 264. The problem often manifests in real-life not with an actual computer-generated list, but with 
a defendant arguing that the patented compound was ―obvious to try‖—because each of the millions of 
candidates were all implicitly known to people in the field. Courts respond to that argument by holding 
that millions of potential candidates cannot all be considered obvious. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. 
Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (requiring that the number of options be 
―small or easily traversed‖). But if the list were explicit, this doctrinal ―out‖ would not be available, 
because an explicit disclosure would not involve a question of its obviousness. 
 265. See, e.g., In re Samour, 571 F.2d 559, 562–64 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (finding prior disclosure of 
the compound invalidated patent). 
 266. Seymore, supra note 61, at 958–59 (―X‘s mere appearance in a document often places it on 
the fast track to anticipation.‖). 
 267. In re Hafner, 410 F.2d 1403, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
 268. See Andrew Chin, Artful Prior Art and the Quality of DNA Patents, 57 ALA. L. REV. 975, 
1011–12 (2006) (describing how a computer-generated list of DNA sequences would satisfy the 
requirements of current law). 
 269. But see id. at 1010 (creating one such list as a ―proof of concept‖). 
 270. Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (―the test 
for conception is whether the inventor had an idea that was definite and permanent enough that one 
skilled in the art could understand the invention; . . . an inventor need not know that his invention will 
work for conception to be complete‖). 
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such as testing, marketing, and commercial manufacturing—are easy.271 
What the pharmaceutical example demonstrates is that this assumption is 
false in at least some cases: in trial and error research, coming up with the 
mental picture or hypothesis (e.g., compound X cures cancer) is easy, 
while testing that hypothesis is hard because there are so many potential 
candidates. But challenging patent law‘s assumption regarding the 
standard for conception (which, as Sichelman acknowledges, is 
―dominant‖ and ―undergirds much of today‘s law‖) is beyond the scope of 
this Article.
272
 It suffices to note that because this assumption is 
independent of the issue I am trying to address, the gigantic-computer-
generated-list problem occurs to the same extent under current law as 
would under my proposal. 
Although my proposal does not cause the problem, one interesting way 
to address it would be to adopt the proposal not as a mandatory 
requirement but as a rebuttable presumption. The patentee‘s insight would 
be the presumptive degree of scope, but courts would have discretion to 
modify the degree of scope if the patentee or a challenger could prove that 
some other degree of scope was more economically sound by presenting 
empirical evidence. As described above, collecting reliable economic 
information about the benefits and costs of individual patents is usually 
not feasible. But in rare circumstances it could be done,
273
 and to that 
extent, economic data should trump legal theory. And this would be 
potentially superior to the current approach: under current law, if a 
compound appears on a list and is deemed non-novel, there is no 
discretion: the patent is per se invalid. 
The reason that a presumption approach is desirable is that any legal 
rule is necessarily imperfect. The benefit of a presumption approach is 
thus that it allows patent scope to be optimally tailored to achieve correct 
rewards in those rare cases where economic information can be collected. 
Another important benefit is that adopting a presumption approach creates 
an incentive to collect such information on the part of litigants, and having 
better empirical data on the operation of the patent system will help 
 
 
 271. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 344 (2010) (―The dominant 
‗reward‘ theory of patenting, which undergirds much of today‘s law, perceives little to no need to 
protect risky and costly post-invention development and commercialization efforts.‖). 
 272. Sichelman proposes a new type of property right to incentivize the post-conception 
commercialization steps. Id. at 345–46. 
 273. The circumstances where the administrative cost can be justified will almost certainly occur 
only when a patent reaches litigation, where more is at stake. See Lemley, supra note 138, at 1510 
(arguing for devoting fewer administrative resources to patent examination and more to patent 
litigation). 
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improve its overall efficiency in addition to helping tailor the scope of 
individual patents. 
Weighed against these benefits is the fact that a presumption will 
involve a greater degree of administrative complexity and hence judicial 
administration cost.
274
 The standard of proof required to rebut the 
presumption and obtain greater or lesser scope will need to be specified, 
including the type and quantity of economic data, and then trials will need 
to be held under the new standard. As noted in Part II.B, antitrust law in 
fact calls for such economics-based fact finding, with expert testimony and 
empirical data collection. The downside of the approach, however, has 
been much greater complexity and higher litigation costs.
275
 Determining 
the details of how to construct a presumption, and ultimately whether its 
tailoring benefits outweigh the administrative costs, is a matter for future 
research. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent law‘s traditional disclosure theory focuses on the embodiment 
disclosed by the specification. Disclosure theory is incoherent because the 
same disclosed embodiment can always be characterized at many equally 
plausible levels of abstraction. Courts then lack any principle for choosing. 
The incoherence of disclosure theory is confirmed by the fact that the 
legalistic rules that emanate from the theory become self-contradictory. In 
both the abstract idea doctrine and the § 112 case law, directly 
contradictory cases stand for either a principle that patentees may claim 
undisclosed future embodiments, or that they may not. A citation to one 
line or the other can justify any outcome. The result is that courts have 
been forced to pick and choose using extra-legal mechanisms, such as by 
surreptitiously using intuitions about the proper economic balance 
between incentive benefits and monopoly costs. While such direct 
economic balancing could in theory produce good economic results, in 
practice the lack of adequate information dooms the approach to failure, at 
least in most cases and for most patents. 
 
 
 274. See generally Richard A. Posner, Employment Discrimination: Age Discrimination and 
Sexual Harassment, 19 INT‘L REV. L. & ECON. 421, 423 (1999) (―Rules have higher error costs but 
lower administrative costs; standards have lower error costs but higher administrative costs. The 
relative size of the two types of cost will determine the efficient choice between the alternative 
methods of regulation in particular settings.‖). Changing my proposed rule into a presumption makes it 
more like a standard, and thus increases its administrative cost while reducing its error cost. 
 275. See supra text accompanying notes 133–36. 
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The solution I propose in this Article is to recognize that the patentee‘s 
contribution to downstream progress is not an embodiment but an idea. A 
patentee‘s moral claim to royalties from subsequent improvers lies in the 
fact that subsequent improvers presumably derive principles and ideas 
from a patentee‘s pioneering work, not on replication of the patentee‘s 
embodiment, which is usually rudimentary (e.g., in the form of a barely-
flying airplane or a barely-working telephone). It follows that patent 
protection should extend to all future uses of the patentee‘s idea, even 
when the later infringing embodiment is a much-improved airplane or a 
much-improved telephone. This moral claim can be stated in economic 
terms: the core purpose of patent law is to protect against misappropriation 
of information goods, and this means the idea and not the embodiment. 
But in order to be fairly credited as the inventor of the idea and obtain a 
monopoly covering all future implementations of that idea, a patentee 
should be required to be the first to invent the idea in addition to merely 
creating one embodiment of it. Inventing an idea means being the first to 
articulate the idea. This standard differs radically from patent law‘s 
conventional novelty standard, which focuses merely on whether the 
patentee is the first to build one embodiment. 
The gap that emerges in current law is that the idea that the patentee 
enforces against downstream improvers may not have originated with the 
patentee at all, but was itself taken from upstream inventors. This is made 
possible by the enablement requirement for prior art, which excludes all 
work by prior inventors who did not create embodiments. But if the 
patentee‘s downstream contribution is deemed to be the idea and not the 
specific embodiment, determining the patentee‘s contribution vis-à-vis 
upstream inventors should be done on the same terms. In short, the 
patentee should be entitled to the insight that he was the first to articulate. 
A key point is that every breakthrough invention necessarily contains a 
new and non-obvious insight, since that insight is what enables the 
patentee to succeed when all prior attempts failed. The Wright brothers did 
not invent the idea of airplanes, which had long existed. But they did 
invent the idea of using rudders for flight control, which then enabled 
them to build a successful airplane embodiment when all prior attempts 
failed. The implication of my standard is that the Wright brothers would 
receive a patent for their breakthrough idea. This also rebuts the science 
fiction objection that my proposal would result in no patent for the 
inventors of a hyperdrive: like the Wright brothers developing a new 
insight to achieve an old dream, the future inventor of a working 
hyperdrive will need to develop a new insight to achieve faster-than-light 
travel. My standard would then protect the as-yet-unknown insight. 
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Adopting this standard has three major advantages. First, it provides a 
coherent principle to select among competing levels of abstraction. The 
Wright brothers are not able to patent all airplanes, because they did not 
invent the idea of airplanes. But neither are they confined to their specific 
embodiment of a barely-flying wooden glider. Instead, they are given a 
reasonable middle ground. The second advantage is that my theory 
provides a much better explanation for actual historical outcomes than the 
incoherent disclosure theory. In reality, the Wright brothers received 
protection that closely matches what my theory would predict, as did 
Samuel Morse and Alexander Graham Bell. Under the traditional 
disclosure theory, by contrast, the seeming contradiction between Morse 
and Bell has puzzled patent lawyers for generations. 
The third advantage is that the middle ground provided by my proposal 
makes a great deal of economic sense. Because the economic role of 
patents is to protect against misappropriation of information goods, 
protecting the breakthrough insight comes very close to the economic 
purpose of the patent system. Of course, as with any legal rule, some 
amount of over- and under-inclusiveness error is inevitable. I do not claim 
that my rule will produce optimal economic outcomes every time, but only 
that it produces reasonable outcomes, and that there is no readily 
administrable legal rule that does better. A direct economic balancing 
approach might in theory achieve even more precision in achieving good 
economic outcomes, but in most cases it would not be administratively 
feasible. 
An extension of this framework would consider adopting the rule as a 
rebuttable presumption, where economic evidence could be introduced to 
vary the amount of scope in cases where direct economic balancing were 
administratively feasible. Such an approach, however, would require 
further research into the proper standard of proof, and also into whether 
the higher administrative costs of such a system are justified to achieve the 
improvement in precision in individual cases. 
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